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Abstract 
In this thesis. we propose a practical novel algorithm, called the Two-Round 
Iterative (TRD aJ~orithm that analyzes the bJ~~ cipher structure referred to as a 
) 
Substitution Permutation Network (SPN). The algorithm characteri~es the resistance of 
the cipher to linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis. By' ~nding the best or 
close to best linear approximation and differential characteristics of the cipher, the 
algorithm can be used to find the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs required to mount 
either attack on the cipher successfully_ An important feature of the algorithm is that the 
complexity of algorithm is linear in terms of number of rounds and hence is able to give 
results in practical time. 
[n this thesis, the algorithm has been applied to l6-bit ciphers to verify the 
effectiveness of the algorithm in finding optimal linear biases and differential 
probabilities. Further, it is applied to realistic 64-bit ciphers based on 8x8 and 4x4 S-
boxes that possess good cryptographic properties. In addition to the TRI algorithm, we 
have also developed two algorithms that are guaranteed to find the optimal linear 
approximation and differential characteristic and applied them to 16-bit ciphers in order 
to examine the TRI algorithm efficiency and effectiveness. It is shown that the TRI 
algorithm is effective in finding the best or close to the best linear approximation and 
differential characteristic and the corresponding linear bias and differential probability. 
Also the TRI algorithm can be practically applied to realistically sized ciphers (e.g. 64-
bits) where the other algorithms are too inefficient to be practical. Experimental data is 
presented in the form of figures and tables which demonstrate the usefulness of the TRI 
algorithm in characterizing the security level of realistic SPN block ciphers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
, 
Cryptography is derived from a Greek word meaning "the sc,ience of hidden or 
secret writing" [1). The use of mathematical functions in cryptdgraphy allows a 
cryptographer to develop encryption routines and digital signatures, which have a great 
use in computer security [1]. The encryption used in a cryptosystem is the practice of 
hiding messages so that they cannot be read by anyone else except the intended recipient. 
Thus encryption is a method of converting a plaintext message into its corresponding 
ciphertext message based on a key [2J. The method of encrypting and decrypting a 
message is called a cipher. 
1.1 Characterization of a Cryptographic System 
Cryptanalysis is the process of attacking and analyzing a cipher by the 
knowledge of ciphertext data or plaintext/ciphertext pairs and the nature of the algorithm 
used for the encryption and decryption [3] [4]. The main idea behind the cryptanalytic 
attack is to deduce the plaintext or the key being used in the cipher. If the attacker 
manages to find the right key then he will be able to deduce the encrypted message and 
can possibly even manipulate the data of some systems, thus posing a threat to 
information security. 
A cryptographic system can be categorized in two ways [4J. Firstly, a 
cryptosystem can be categorized based on the number of keys used. If both the sender 
and the receiver use the same key for encryption and decryption, then the system is 
" referred to as a symmetric key or secret-key cryptosystem [1]. However if the sender and 
the receiver use different keys for encryption and decryption, then the system is called an 
asymmetric key or public key cryptosystem {l]. An asymmetric cipher uses a public key 
., 
for encryption and a private (secret) key for decryption. Symmetric/ key encryption is , 
much faster as compared to asymmetric key encryption; however, the problem with 
symmetric key is key exchange [1] [4]. 
Secondly, a cryptographic system can be classified according to the way the 
plaintext is processed. A block cipher processes an input block of bits to produce an 
output block of bits [5]. In contrast, a stream cipher will continuously process input bits 
to produce output bits one at a time [4]. The practicality of both these ciphers depends on 
the type of application for which the cipher is intended. 
1.2 Symmetric-key and Asymmetric-key Algorithms 
A symmetric-key cipher is an algorithm that uses the same cryptographic keys for 
encryption and decryption [2}. Both the sender and the receiver share the secret key over 
a private information channel. The major advantage of a symmetric-key algorithm over 
an asymmetric-key algorithm is that it is much less computationally intensive [1]. 
However, the shared secret key needs to be kept secure during distribution. Due to this 
reason, symmetric-key algorithms are often not preferred for authentication and 
authorization purposes (I]. A symmetric-key cryptosystem is shown in Figure 1.1 where 
M is plaintext, C is ciphertext and K is the cipher key. 
K,y 
Soo~, 
" 
Figure 1.1: Symrnetric·key Cryptosystem 
Contrary to a symmetric-key algorithm, an asymmetric-key algorithm is an 
algorithm that allows a user to communicate securely without having prior access to a 
shared secret key. This is done by using a pair of cryptographic keys, designated as 
public key and private key, which are related mathematically. In an asymmetric-key 
algorithm, the private key is kept secret, while the public key may be widely distributed 
[2]. Hence the sender encrypts the information by using the public key of the receiver and 
the receiver decrypts the information using its private key_ Asymmetric-key algorithms 
are widely used for authentication purposes during a communication between two parties. 
Besides this, it is also used in digital signatures and during the key exchange to establish 
a key for symmetric-key encryption during a communication. Some of the popular 
asymmetric-key algorithms are RSA and Digital Signature Standard (DSS) cryptosystem 
[4]. An asymmetric-key cryptosystem is shown in Figure 1.2 where M is plaintext, Cis 
ciphertext, Ks is private key and Kl'is public key. 
" 
PUbliCkey~ ' priVatekey 
Figure 1.2: Asymmetric-key Cryptosystem 
1.3 Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers 
In cryptography, a block cipher is a cipher which operates on fixed-length groups 
of bits, termed blocks, with an unvarying keyed transfonnation [4]. When encrypting, a 
block cipher takes an N-bit block of plaintext as input and outputs a corresponding N-bit 
block of ciphertext. The exact transformation is controlled by a second input called the 
cipher key. The decryption process is similar to the encryption process. The decryption 
algorithm takes an N-bit block of ciphertext together with the key bits, and yields the 
original N-bit block of plaintext. 
A block cipher consists of two paired algorithms, one for encryption, E, and 
another for decryption, FI, Both algorithms accept two inputs: an input block of size N 
bits and a key of size k bits, yielding an N-bit output block. For anyone fixed key, 
decryption is the inverse function of encryption, and is represented by equation (1.1) 
(1.1) 
4 
" for any block of input M and key K. Many block ciphers can ~ categorized as Feistel 
networks [4], or as more general Substitution Permutation Networks (SPNs) [6]. 
Arithmetic operations, logical operations (especially XOR), S-boxes and various 
" 
permutations are all frequently used as components in block cipher~~ Some of the most 
widely used block ciphers are Data Encryption Standard (DES) [2] [4], Triple DES [4], 
and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [4]. 
On the other hand, a stream cipher is a cipher in which the plaintext is encrypted 
one bit at a time, and in which the transfonnation of successive bits varies during the 
encryption. Typically, ciphertext bits are generated by XORing plaintext bits with a 
pseudo random sequence of bits referred to as key stream [2J [4]. The encryption of each 
bit is dependent on the current state of the key stream generator. Stream ciphers are often 
used in applications where plaintext comes in quantities of unknowable length, for 
example, a secure wireless connection. If a block cipher were to be used in this type of 
application, the designer would need to choose either transmission efficiency or 
implementation complexity, since block ciphers cannot directly work on blocks shorter 
than their block size. The major advantage of a stream cipher is that the stream cipher 
algorithms are typically faster than the block cipher algorithms [2]. Also, the stream 
cipher has a low error propagation rale. However, the stream cipher requires 
synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver end because the same random 
stream should be available at the sender and the receiver. Hence the need for the 
synchronization limits its usefulness in low bandwidth connections. One of the widely 
used stream ciphers in software is RC4 [4]. 
1.4 Motivation 
Linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis are two of the most 
fundamental cryptanalytic attacks on symmetric-ke~_. block ciphers. Linear cryptanalysis 
was first introduced by Matsui and was successfully applied to cr~tanalyze the Data 
Encryption Standard (DES) cipher by using linear approximations [71 j[8]. On the other 
hand, differential cryptanalysis was introduced by Biham and Shamir, and was used to 
cryptanalyze DES by using differential characteristics [9]. Even though both the attacks 
were initially targeted at DES, they can be and are used to characterize the security level 
of all block ciphers. One of the common block cipher structures is referred as a 
Substitution Permutation Network (SPN). It is used in many current modern day ciphers 
like DES and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Hence, it is of interest to 
characterize the applicability of linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis to the 
SPN structure. 
Our work is motivated by Matsui's algorithm on DES, where he developed a tool 
to linearly and differentially cryptanalyze DES ciphers. In our work we wanted to 
develop a similar tool to apply to SPNs, such that it is efficient and practical to apply to 
realistically sized ciphers. 
1.5 Objective of the Thesis 
The primary objective of the thesis is to develop an automated tool to analyze the 
resistance of SPNs to linear and differential cryptanalysis. To this aim, we have 
developed a practical algorithm called the Two-Round Iterative (TRI) algorithm that tries 
to find the best linear approximation and differential characteristic of the SPN cipher in 
" 
an automated way. By finding the best or close to best linear approximation and 
differential characteristic of the cipher, the algorithm can be used to find the number of 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs required to mount either attack (linear/differential) on the cipher 
'. 
successfully. An important feature of the TRI algorithm is thar the complexity of 
algorithm is linear in terms of number of rounds and hence is able to give results in 
practical time for realistically-sized cipher. We have shown in our work that the TRI 
algorithm can be practically applied to realistically-sized ciphers (e.g. 64-bit block 
ciphers) where other algorithms are too inefficient. Hence, the TRI algorithm is a useful 
tool to examine the properties of SPN ciphers including S-boxes and the permutation 
structure that are necessary for good cryptographic resistance to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
The outline of the thesis is listed below: 
In Chapter 2, we will study three different types of practically realizable SPN 
ciphers; one is a l6-bit SPN cipher using 4x4 S-boxes and the other two are 64-bit 
cipher using 4x4 S-boxes and 8x8 S-boxes. A discussion is given along with an 
example to attack the SPN cipher linearly and differentially. 
Chapter 3 deals with a number of algorithms that have been studied and 
developed related to linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis. These algorithms 
find the best linear bias or differential probability for an SPN block cipher and a 
corresponding linear approximation or differential characteristic. Some preliminary 
results are also given in this chapter which shows our algorithm is a useful tool to look 
I I 
into properties of S-boxes and cipher structures that are necessary for good cryptographic 
resistance to linear and differential cryptanalysis. 
In Chapter 4, detailed discussions given on the results obtained using our efficient 
non-optimal algorithm and the optimal algorithm (in tenns of largesrbias or differential 
probability). These results are shown in the fonn of tables and figurc;s, and comparisons 
are made between the optimal solution and the non-optimal solution where necessary. 
In Chapter 5, concluding remarks are made related to our work and some 
limitations related to our algorithm are noted. The limitations of our algorithm can be 
considered for the future research work. 
" 
Chapter 2 
Background Review of SPNs 
, 
Feistel proposed the use of substitutions and permutations in implementing a 
. 
strong cipher in 1973 [10]. He was inspired by Claude Shannon's work that introduced 
alternating confusion and diffusion functions in implementing a powerful product cipher 
[11]. The methodology of diffusion is to make a complex statistical relationship between 
plaintext and ciphertext so that it prevents the cryptanalyst from deducing any key. This 
is achieved by having each plaintext bit to affect all ciphertext bits. However, even after 
diffusion, if the attacker manages to fonn some statistical relationship with the 
knowledge of plaintext and ciphertext bits, then the concept of confusion implemented in 
the cipher structure thwarts the discovery of key bits [4}. The idea of confusion is to 
make an intricate relationship between ciphertexts and the encryption key bits so that the 
deduction of key bits is not viable. This is typically achieved by implementing a complex 
nonlinear substitution in the cipher structure. The SPNs that we will study in the thesis 
have the characteristics suggested by Shannon and Feistel. We are analyzing SPNs 
because they are still widely used in today's modern cipher design as in DES and AES 
[4]. 
In this chapter, we describe SPNs and examine the applicability of linear and 
differential cryptanalysis to SPN structure. 
t ' 
2.1 Description of SPNs 
A basic SPN is a symmetric-key block cipher structure [12]. Each round of cipher 
structure consists of a substitution block, a pennutat.i~n block and key mixing. The N-bit 
I 
plaintext after processing through R rounds gives the N-bit ciphertext~ In the substitution 
stage, an N-bit block is divided into m-bit suh-blocks. Each of the m-1:Iitj sub-blocks is fed 
into a bijective mXm substitution box (S-hox). An S-box is a mapping 
{O,l)" --> {O,l)" [13]. A substitution block is immediately followed by a pennutation 
block where bit-wise transposition takes place. In general, the permutation is an invertible 
linear transformation [14] [15]. All rounds in an SPN are alike except the last round 
where the permutation is not done. A good SPN cipher should incorporate a sufficient 
number of rounds R and a good design of S-boxes (A good S-box have mathematical 
properties that make the cipher hard to analyze). Cryptanalysis will be difficult if the 
number of rounds in the cipher is large, even if the S-box design is relatively weak (A 
weak S-box have mathematical properties that make the cipher easy to analyze). 
Similarly, if the S-box design is strong then a more secure cipher can be obtained for 
lesser number of rounds. Larger S-boxes are more resistant to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis but require large lookup tables to implement. Another disadvantage of large 
S-boxes is the resulting complexity in hardware implementation. Hence a limit of m is 
usually 8 to 10 for practical implementation [16J. A sample 4x4 S-box and a 
permutation mapping are shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 respectively. The S-box 
mapping shown in Table 2.1 is taken from the DES cipher [4J. In this table, the leftmost 
bit is represented as the most significant bit in the hexadecimal notation. In Table 2.2, the 
number represents the bit position in the block. 
10 
" The key mixing in an SPN is achieved by using bitwise XOR between the key bits 
associated with a round (referred to as subkey bits) and the input data block to a round. 
There are R+ I suhkeys that are obtained by running a key scheduling algorithm with the 
cipher key as an input. However in OUf studies we will not consider- a key scheduling , 
algorithm to generate suhkeys. Instead, all bits of the suhkeys I are independently 
generated and are unrelated to each other. This assumption is consistent with the 
presentation of linear and differential cryptanalysis. 
Table 2.1: S-box Representation (in hexadecimal) 
Table 2.2: Pennutation of Bits 
For an SPN, decryption is similar to encryption and can be viewed as simply 
having the data run backward through the network. The S-box and the permutation 
mapping in the decryption network are the inverse of the encryption mapping. The 
subkeys used for the decryption are the same as encryption except they are applied in 
reverse order. Since no permutation is applied in the last round, the encryption and 
II 
,j 
decryption network look alike. In the following section we will look at the structure of 
SPNs that are discussed in the thesis. 
2.2 Specific Ciphers Studied in Thesis 
In the thesis we will study three types of SPNs: 
• 16-bit SPN using 4x4S-boxes (Cipher-A) 
• 64-bit SPN using 8x8 S-boxes (Cipher-B) 
• 64-bit SPN using 4x4S-boxes (Cipher-C) 
2.2.116-bit SPN using 4x4S-boxes (Cipher-A) 
A 16-bit SPN structure is shown in Figure 2.1 [16]. From the Figure 2.1, we can 
see that the 16-bit plaintext after processing through R rounds of the cipher gives the 16-
bit ciphertext. In the figure R is assumed to be 4. Throughout the thesis we will use one 
mapping for all S-boxes in all the rounds of cipher. Advantages of the use of one S-box 
mapping are the ease of study, consistency with the AES structure and a compact 
hardware and software implementation. In this work some good S-boxes are used during 
the simulations that have good cryptographic properties like the DES 4x4 S-boxes. The 
pennutation is straightforward as the output i of S-box) is connected to input) of S-box i 
as shown in Table 2.2. 
The subkey layer simply represents the bit-by-bit XOR of the subkey and the data 
block. Thus cipher structure is not a realistically sized cipher. With only a 16-bit block, 
the cipher would be susceptible to several security flaws. However, this structure is a 
12 
I' 
useful one to consider when examining the practicality of cipher analysis and design 
techniques. 
P, pIa in text ........ PI6 
C~~~===:=;::;::;:::===~~~===~=:=~subkey(K,) 
subkey( K,) ] 
Round 2 
c:::::~:===:::::~=:=====:=;::;::;:::===~~::=J subkey(KJ ) 
subkey(K. ) ] 
Round 4 
subkey(K,) 
C .......... ciphertext .......... C 
Figure 2.1: 16-bit SPN using 4x4 S-boxes (Cipher-A) 
13 
2.2.2 64-bi! SPN using 8x8 S-boxes (Cipher-B) 
A 64-bit SPN structure is shown in Figure 2.2 [13] with the number of rounds 
given as R=3. The 64 input bits are divided into eight sub-blocks and run into eight S-
boxes as shown in Figure 2.2. This structure is an extension of the st~bture discussed in 
Section 2.2.1. This is a more realistic cipher structure as compared to' 16-bit SPN using 
, 
4x4 S-boxes and could be used as the basis for a secure block cipher. A 64-bit round key 
is mixed in each round which can be obtained by running the key scheduling algorithm 
[4] or generating the bits independently. The transposition of bits and subkey layer in the 
cipher structure are the same as discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
14 
I' 
64 biJ.Y.e!:.aintext 
~--------------------- --------------------~ 
P 1. ... P 8 P 9 .. .. P 16P17 .. P'4 P25 .... P32 P33 .... P40 P41 .. .P48 P49 .. P" P57 .... P64 
Permutation Round 1 
64 bits 
Subkey bits Round 2 (K,) 
Permutation Round 2 
64 bits 
Subkey bits Round 3 (K,) 
Subkey bits Round 4 (K4 ) 
64 bits Ciphertext 
Figure 2.2: 64-bit SPN using 8x8S-boxes (Cipher-B) 
15 
2.2.3 64-bit SPN using 4x4S-boxes (Cipher-C) 
The third SPN under consideration is a type of SPN architecture called Extended 
Tree-structured SPN (TS-SPN) [14]. The advantage of using an Extended TS-SPN that, 
while providing good diffusion properties, it provides a single pemjutation for all the 
rounds in the cipher and can be used for any number of rounds for a given value of Nand 
m where N is the number of plaintext I ciphertext bits and m is the number of input / 
output bits from an $-box. Hence the hardware implementation of Extended TS-SPN is 
easy as compared to a basic TS-SPN [14] which requires different permutations in each 
round. In our thesis, we will consider an Extended TS-SPN that has m=4 (i.e. uses 4x4 
S-boxes) and N=64 as shown in Figure 2.3. The permutation of bits for m=4 and N=64 is 
shown in Table 2.3. 
Input I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 
Output I 5 9 I3 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 
Input 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
Output 2 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62 
Input 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 
Output 3 7 II 15 19 23 27 31 35 39 43 47 51 55 59 63 
Input 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 
Output 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 
Table 2.3: Pennutation of Bits for Cipher-C 
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_________________ 6_4 __ b_~_la __ in_t_e_x_t ____________ ___ 
r -----., 
Pi ... P4 . .P . ... P1' .. .P1 . .. .P,O .P'4 ... P" ... P32".P' . .. .P40 .. .P44 .P4' ... P" .. 'p, • . P60 .. .P .. 
Permutation Round 1 
64 bits 
Subkey bits Round 2 (K,) 
Permutation Round 2 
64 bits 
Subkey bits Round 3 (K,) 
Subkey bits Round 4 (K4 ) 
64 bits Ciphertext 
Figure 2.3: 64-bits SPN using 4x4 S-boxes (Cipher-C) 
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2.3 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
The AES is a block cipher which was proposed by Rijrnen and Daemen [17J [18] 
and adopted by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as a US 
'". 
government standard [18]. Subsequently, it has been widely use~' in providing data 
security in a large variety of applications. The cipher can have differellt block lengths and 
key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bits. Some of the important characteristics of AES are 
listed below [4]: 
It provides resistance against all known attacks. 
It offers speed and code compactness on a wide range of platforms. 
The design of the cipher is simple. 
The structure of AES incorporates substitution and pennutation blocks in each 
round. Just like basic SPNs it processes the entire data block in parallel during each round 
of substitution and permutation. However, while similar to a basic SPN, the permutation 
layer which is essentially a linear transformation (using XOR of bits) of the bits in the 
data block [4]. The linear transformation layer is computed of two components: "shift 
rows" (essentially a permutation of bytes within the block) and "mix column" which 
computes a mixing of bits by computing over Galois field GF (2s). The block diagram 
for one round encryption of AES cipher is shown in Figure 2.4. 
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One Round 
Figure 2.4: Block Diagram for One Round Encryption of AES [4] 
2.4 Lineal" Cryptanalysis 
In many real world applications the attacker of a cipher can possess information 
on a random set of plaintexts and ciphertexts. Linear cryptanalysis provides a mechanism 
to obtain suhkey bits from the knowledge of plaintext and ciphertext bits [7] [19]. Linear 
cryptanalysis is known as an effective attack on various block cipher structures. The 
attack is more efficient than exhaustively searching the subkey bits. It is considered to be 
a known plaintext attack because the attacker has the knowledge of the set of plaintexts 
and the corresponding ciphertexts [16] [20]. 
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The basic principle of linear cryptanalysis is to analyze the S-hoxes and extend 
the properties of the $-hoxes to the entire cipher structure [7]. The idea is to find a 
statistically tendency towards a linear relation bet,:,een a portion of plaintext bits and 
ciphertext bits, where linearity refers to bitwise XOR operation betweJn bits as shown in 
Equation (2.1): 
(2.1) 
where Xi represents the rh bit of the input X=: [X 1 ,X2 , .. ] and Yj represents the /h bit 
of the output Y =[Y"Y, ... j. The Equation (2.1) shows the bitwise XOR relationship 
between the u input bits and v output bits. 
In the Equation (2.1), if we randomly choose u and v independent bits for which 
probability of zero is equal to 112 and place them in Equation then the probability that 
expression holds true is 112. Linear cryptanalyst exploits the likelihood of Equation (2.1) 
to hold true to deviate from probability of 112. The deviation of value can be towards zero 
or towards one. The amount by which the probability of linear expression deviates from 
112 is referred as linear probability bias. Hence if the expression holds with the 
probability PI.' then the linear probability bias is calculated aSE = PL -1/2. The 
weakness of the cipher depends upon the value of PI.. If PI. =1 , then expression in 
Equation (2.1) exactly signifies linear behavior and if PI. =0 then the relationship is affine 
in the cipher. In both the cases, it symbolizes weak cipher characteristics. Thus, the 
higher the magnitude of E, the lesser the number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs is 
required, and hence the easier will be the linear attack. 
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When setting up a linear attack the Equation (2.1) can also be written to 
incorporate key bits in the form of Equation (2.2). 
(2.2) 
where K / is the l'h bit of the key K ;; [K[, K 2 ... ] and K is the complet~ set of subkey bits. 
The notation w is the total number of key bits involved during the approximation. During 
the attack, the key bits K are fixed but unknown. 
If the right hand side of the equation is equal to zero, then E will have the same 
sign (+ or -) as the bias of the expression involving the subkey sum and, if the right hand 
side of equation is equal to one then E will have the opposite sign. 
The piling-up lemma, as proposed by Matsui [16], is used to calculate the 
probability of n independent random binary variables, Xl> X 2' ...• X" • summing to 0, and 
is given by Equation (2.3): 
Prob(X, Ell X, Ell .. X , =0)=1I2+r'u£, (2.3) 
The Equation (2.3) can be represented in form of Equation (2.4): 
Prob(X , Ell X, EIl ... X, =0) =112+£,.>.3. (2.4) 
where c l,2,)p ... " symbolizes the bias of XI E9 X 2 E9 .. X .. =0. 
2.4.1 Construction of Linear Approximation Table or Bias-table 
In this section, we will look into the creation of the linear approximation table or 
bias· table of S·boxes. In the SPN structure, the only non-linearity is due to the presence 
of S-boxes. So a linear approximation is made using Equation (2.1) for the non-linearity 
introduced by the S·boxes · in a cipher. We will explain the characteristics of S-boxes in 
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the context of thel6-bit SPN using 4x4 S-boxes. A 4x4S-box has an $-box mapping 
similar to the one shown in Table 2.4. The input vector X =[Xp X Z,X3.X.] and the 
output vector Y = [~'Y2'Y3,~J takes part in the line,,¥" approximation. The S-box that we 
) 
used to illustrate the construction of bias-table is from the second row bf the S-box SI [4]. 
Table 2.4: $-box Representation (in hexadecimal) 
Consider the linear expressionX4 EBt; EBlYz =0. It can be inferred from Table 2.5 
that expression X 4 EEl >'t E9 Y2 = 0 is true for exactly 10 out of maximum 16 possible cases, 
where each corresponds to one of the possible values for X. Hence the probability bias e 
is equal to ~_..t.=~. 
16 2 16 
Similarly, consider the linear expression XI $ X2 E9 Xl E9 X. E9 Y, =0. The 
probability bias e for this expression is equal to g-.!. = -±-. The affine relationship can 
16 2 16 
be seen from the expression X z E9 Yz E9 Y3 E9 Y4 = o. The value computed for e is equal to 
- - - = 2. For the linear cryptanalysis the magnitude of e plays a pivotal role in the 
16 2 16 
complexity of attacking a cipher; hence, the affine relationship is equa1ly used to get the 
best result. 
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A complete list of all the linear approximations of the S-box can be viewed in 
Table 2.6. The row indicates the input sum or masking input bits and is denoted by rx . 
Similarly, the column indicates the output sum or m.~sking output bits and is denoted by 
rr. Each element in the Table 2.6 is the decimal numerator value fJ every possible e 
value, such thate is given by table value divided by 16. 
We can deduce some important properties from the bias-table [16]. Firstly, the 
values in the bias-table will always be an even number. Secondly, the probability that any 
sum of a non-empty subset of input bits is equal to the sum involving no output bits is 
112. Thirdly, the bias value for the linear combination involving no input bits and no 
output bits is 112. The resulting value 8 can be seen in the first row and first column of 
the bias-table. It can also be noted from the bias-table that the sum of any row or column 
is either +8 or -8. Similar concepts can be considered for the bias-table of an 8x8 S-box 
where the table contains 256 rows and 256 columns and the bias is given by the table 
value divided by 256. 
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x, x, x, x, y, Y, Y, Y, t;(f)Y2 X,EIlX, EIlX, Ell,x, Y2Eln; €9Y4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 I I I I I 0 I I 
0 0 I 0 0 I I I I I I 
0 0 I I 0 I 0 0 I 0 I 
0 I 0 0 I I I 0 0 I 0 
0 I 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 0 I 
0 I I 0 I I 0 I 0 0 0 
0 I I I 0 0 0 I 0 I I 
I 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 I I I 
I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I 0 0 
I 0 I I I I 0 0 0 0 I 
I I 0 0 I 0 0 I I 0 I 
I I 0 I 0 I 0 I I I 0 
I I I 0 0 0 I I 0 I 0 
I I I I I 0 0 0 I 0 0 
Table 2.5: Sample Linear Approximation of S-box 
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(iX,iY) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
" 
0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -2 -2 6 f 2 2 2 
2 0 2 -2 -4 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 -2 4 
3 0 2 2 0 4 -2 2 0 -2 0 4 2 -2 0 0 -2 
4 0 2 -2 4 -2 0 0 -2 0 2 2 0 -2 0 4 2 
5 0 2 2 0 2 4 0 -2 2 -4 0 -2 0 2 2 0 
6 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 -6 2 2 
7 0 0 0 0 2 2 -6 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 -2 2 2 -2 2 2 2 2 4 0 0 -4 
9 0 0 0 0 -2 2 2 6 0 0 0 0 -2 2 2 -2 
A 0 2 -2 4 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 -2 4 2 -2 0 
B 0 2 2 0 -2 -4 0 2 4 -2 2 0 2 0 0 2 
C 0 -2 2 4 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 -2 0 -4 2 
D 0 -2 -2 0 4 -2 2 0 4 2 -2 0 0 2 2 0 
E 0 -4 4 0 0 0 0 0 -2 2 2 -2 2 2 2 2 
F 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 -4 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 2.6: Linear Approximation Table or Bias-table 
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2.4.2 Linear Approximation of the Overall Cipher Structure 
Once the bias-table is constructed for the S-boxes, we can find the linear 
approximation of the whole cipher structure by usi~g Equation (2.1). Since we assume 
that each S-box is independently related to each other in the cipher s;;Ucture. the overall 
bias value is found by concatenating the linear approximation of ~~ch S-box. Using 
Equation (2.1), we find an expression between plaintext bits and the second last round 
output bits. A subset of the subkey bits that follow the last round are obtained by using 
the linear expression that constitute the plaintext bits and second last round output bits. 
The attack on the cipher structure is explained with reference to the 16-bit SPN 
using 4x4 S-boxes where each S-box in the SPN is assumed to be the S-box of Table 
2.4. In Figure 2.5, a sample attack is illustrated. From Figure 2.5 we can see the active S-
boxes and the corresponding rx and ry values for each round. The approximation is 
made on the S-boxes involved that are referred as active S-boxes, as shown in Table 2.7. 
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p, p" 
subkey(K,) ] 
I Round I 
, 
subkey(K, ) ] 
Round 2 
subkey(K, ) ] 
Round 3 
subkey(K, ) ] 
Round 4 
1~~~~~~~~~~~~~g~~~~~~~?SUbkey(K') ~ K S•16 
Figure 2.5: Linear Cryptanalysis of Cipher.A 
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ACfIVES-BOX S, j : LINEAR LINEAR BIAS: e 
LINEAR EXPRESSION PROBABILITY: Pf 
I 
S" :Xt -y; eY2 12116 4116 
, 
, 
S" :x]-r; E9Y2 12116 4116 
S" :XJ EeX'-Y2 12116 4116 
S" :X)(f)X'=Y2 12116 4116 
S" : Xl eX2 =1'; EBY2 $1-; €BY4 10/16 2116 
Table 2.7: Approximation Equations for Active S-boxes 
Let Uj represent the 16-bit block of bits for the input, V; represent the 16-bit 
block of bits for the output of the round is-boxes and U j,i and 'I; ,j represents the /' bit 
of block Uj and V; respectively. The bits are numbered from left to right from 1 to 16. 
Similarly. let Kj represent the suhkey block of bits XORed at the input to round i. The 
linear approximation expression of active S-boxes involved for each round is shown in 
Table 2.8. 
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ROUND NUMBER: n 
4 
LINEAR EXPRESSION 
UI.9 =V;,g e~vO 
V I,l) = V I,L) EEl V; ,]4 
" 
V2.2 -U2.J fIJU2,4> U2J -V;,9 EBK;,J 
V2.6 =U2,7 EBU2.8 ,U2,4 ;V; ,13 EEl K2,4 
U2.7 ;: V; ,IO EB Kv ,U2,8 =V;.14 EB K2.8 
U 3,5 EB U 3,6 - V3,S EB V),6 EEl V) ,1 EB V ),8 
U 3,., =V2•2 EEl K)J, U ),6 =V2,6 EEl K ),6 
U 4,2 = V ),S EB K 4 ,2' U 4.6 = V3.6 EB K 4.6 
U4 ,IO =V3,7 EEl K4•LO ,U4 ,14 ;;:V3.s EEl K4J4 
Table 2.8: Linear Expression for Each Round 
The plaintext bits P; are related to input bits of round one with the Equation 
V I.'J = ~ EEl K I•9 andUI.lJ = ~3 EB K l,IJ ' Solving the linear expression defined in Table 2.8, 
the final expression obtained involves the portion of the plaintext bits, the second last 
round output bits and the subkey bits, and is given by 
(2.5) 
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where Le K is the XOR sum of the subkey bits involved in the approximations of Table 
2.8. The bias value for the whole cipher structure is calculated using the piling-up lemma 
and is equal to 
The value Le K is fixed and can be either a or I. Thus Equation (2.5) represents the 
fonn of Equation (2.1) if L e K ;(). If L e K ::; I then we will have affine relationship and 
the bias value of the cipher structure will be equal to -~. Since in linear cryptanalysis 
128 
the magnitude of bias plays the important role in detennining the last round subkey bits 
and hence finding the number of known plaintext and ciphertext pairs for the attack, the 
value of Le K doesn't affect the end result. The number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs 
that are required during the attack is roughly equal to e-2 as suggested by Matsui [7J 
[16]. 
Once an R-l round linear approximation is determined with high probability bias , 
the last round partial subkey bits are recovered by partially decrypting the last round of 
cipher for all possible values for the subkey bits and for all plaintext ciphertext pairs. In 
our example, the target partial last round subkey bits are Ks., to KS•16 ' A counter variable 
is incremented for each possible value for the target subkey, each time the linear 
expression in Equation (2.5) holds true. The linear expression is tested for a large number 
of plaintext and ciphertext pairs. The correct partial subkey will have counter variable 
value that differs maximum from half the number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs. The 
result will be practically correct because the correct partial subkey will result in the linear 
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approximation holding true with large bias (similar to the calculated E). An incorrect key 
will be equivalent to a random guess and has probability equal to Y2 of satisfying the 
linear expression. Hence the correct partial subkey ~~ts will result in a bias given by 
(2.6) 
, 
where Epruc is the practical bias value obtained by running the test10n the obtained 
plaintext / ciphertext data, count is the counter variable that keeps the count when linear 
expression is true and N PC is the number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs. The value of 
E proc should be close to the theoretical bias of E=~. 
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[n the example above, all key bits in the last round are obtained at once by the 
approximation. But the approximation illustrated does not give a large bias value. Hence 
another approach would be to partially attack last round subkey bits that involve large 
bias value but with less number of known plaintext and ciphertext pairs. When the key 
bits are recovered partially, the methodology discussed above is applied continuously till 
all subkey bits in last round are recovered. Once all last round subkey bits are decrypted, 
the subkey bits in other rounds can be easily attacked by working backwards through the 
cipher using the same plaintext I ciphertext data. 
2.5 Differential Cryptanalysis 
Unlike linear cryptanalysis, differential cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack 
[9} [211. In this approach, the attacker chooses plaintext input and tries to inspect the 
output in order to obtain the subkey bits. In differential cryptanalysis, the attacker tries to 
find high probability matches between plaintext differences and the differences between 
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the last rounds of cipher [16]. Consider the m-bit input vector X =[Xl'Xz' ... Xm] and the 
m-bit output vectorY=[l';,Yp, .. Ym ]. The notations Xaand Xp represent the two inputs 
used for the difference during the differential attack. while Ya and rfJ signify their 
, 
corresponding outputs respectively. The input difference and output difference are given 
by M=XaEeX p and LlY=Ya E9Yp respectively, where Ee represents bitwise XOR 
operation. The notation (M ,.1y)is referred to as a difference pair. 
The idea of the differential attack is to find the maximum probability PD for the 
differential pair. The value of PD should be greater than~. We will call a differential 
characteristic as a sequence of !1X and .1.Yover the rounds of the cipher such that .6.Y for 
the /' round corresponds to 6X for the j + I round. 
2.5.1 Construction of Difference-table 
In this section, we will look into the creation of the difference-table of S-boxes. In 
the SPN structure, the differential characteristic of the overall cipher structure is 
constructed by exploiting the properties of S-boxes. The high probability of a difference 
pair for each round is concatenated to find good overall differential probability PD and 
the corresponding differential characteristic. The subkey bits of the cipher are not present 
in the difference expression unlike the linear expression in linear cryptanalysis. This is 
because of the differential characteristic: the subkey bits are present as output difference 
in the /' round and as input difference in round j + I, and hence they cancel out each 
other when the difference expression is evaluated. We will explain the creation of S-
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boxes in the context of the 16-bit SPN using 4x4 S-boxes. The input 
vectorX=[X I ,X2 ,XJ,X 4 ] and the output vector Y=[~'Y2' Yl,Y4] takes part in the 
difference pair of S-boxes. The S-box that we used for the construction of difference-
I 
table is from the second row of the S-box S] [4J as shown in Table 2.4. 
x Y Ill.Y(M =0010) Ill.Y(M =0111) I 
0000 0000 0111 0001 
0001 1111 1011 0010 
0010 0111 0111 0101 
0011 0100 1011 1010 
0100 1110 0011 1010 
0101 0010 0011 0101 
0110 1101 0011 0010 
0111 0001 0011 0001 
1000 1010 0110 0010 
1001 0110 1101 0101 
1010 1100 0110 1001 
1011 1011 1101 0010 
1100 1001 1010 0010 
1101 0101 1101 1001 
1110 0011 1010 0101 
1111 1000 1101 0010 
Table 2.9: Sample Difference Pairs afthe S-box 
A sample difference pair of the S-box of Table 2.4 is consbUcted as shown in 
Table 2.9. The output difference value 6.Y is calculated for a given !lX by 
X, EllM = X" => Y" EllY, =ll.Y (2.7) 
where subscripts rand sr correspond to row number in Table 2.9. When the rdo row 
element of vector X is bitwise XORed with a fixed M, then the resultant value is 
located at row sr in the column of vector X . The notation ::::::. signifies the bijective 
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mapping between X and Y. The Equation (2.7) can be explained by an example. If X, = 
0001 and M= 0010, then X,EIlM=X,, = 0011. The corresponding value of output 
Y, when input X, = 0011 is equal to 0100. The v~lue y" when XORed with Y, = 1111 
I 
results in6.Y = lOll as shown in the second row of column three in Thble 2.9. 
, 
The difference-table is created by counting the number of occurrences of the 
6.Yvalue for a given tlX value. From the Table 2.9 the number of occurrences of 6.Y = 
0010 when tlX = 0111 is equal to 6. Therefore in the difference-table as shown in Table 
2.10 the value corresponding to(M=Olll,ll.Y=OOlO) is equal to 6. The resulting 
differential probability for the (M ,6.Y) pair will be equal to 6/16. The values shown in 
the difference-table are represented in decimal form. 
From the difference-table we can view some interesting properties [16]. All the 
values in the table are positive and even. The sum of all elements in a row and column is 
equal to 2m • We also notice that when.iX = 0 or 6.Y = 0, all the values in the row and 
column are equal to 0 except when .iX = 6.Y = 0 the table value is equal to 16. 
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(M,t.Y) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 2 
2 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 4 0 0 
3 0 4 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 
4 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 
5 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
6 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 6 0 
7 0 2 6 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 2 2 0 0 2 2 
9 0 0 2 0 0 4 2 0 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 
A 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 0 0 
B 0 4 0 2 0 0 2 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 
C 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 2 0 0 0 
D 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
E 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 
F 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 4 2 2 2 0 
Table 2.10: Difference-table of the S-box 
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2.5.2 Differential Characteristic of the Overall Cipher Structure 
The presence of the key does not have any effect on the differential characteristic 
of the cipher [16] [22]. Hence the input difference going to the S-box will have the same 
effect if the subkey is present or absent. The overall differential Char~beristic is obtained 
by concatenating the S-box difference pairs in each round, such that overall differential 
characteristic involves the plaintext bits and the input bits of the last round of S-boxes. 
The subset of the subkey bits that follow the last round are obtained by using the 
differential characteristic that associated with the plaintext bits and second last round 
output bits [16] [23]. 
The attack on the cipher structure is explained with reference to 16-bit SPN using 
4x4 S-boxes. In Figure 2.6, a sample attack on the 4 round cipher is illustrated. Figure 
2.6 shows the active S-boxes, and the corresponding 6X and 8Y values for each round. 
The difference pairs of the S-boxes involved that are referred to as active S-boxes, are 
shown in Table 2.11. 
ACTNE DIFFERENTIAL 
S-BOXES: (dX,L\.Y) PROBABILITY 
Sij Pu 
s" (I,C) 8116 
Table 2.11: Difference Pairs of Active 
S-boxes 
S" (I,C) 8116 
S" (I,C) 8116 
s" (C,4) 6/16 
s" (C,4) 6116 
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subkey(K,) ] 
I Round 1 
, 
, 
subkey(K,) ] 
Round 2 
subkey(K, ) ] 
Round 3 
subkey(K,) ] 
Round 4 
C~~~~~~g~~;=~~~===~~~JsubkeY(K~) 
Figure 2.6: Differential Cryptanalysis of Cipher-A 
The overall differential probability of the cipher is given by PD = n PD [16] , 
where PD is the differential probability of each active S-box involved in the differential 
characteristic of cipher. In other words, the overall differential probability is simply the 
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product of all active S~box probabilities. Then from Figure 2.6, the partial subkey bits 
that are attacked are Kjj to K j ,8 ' Therefore the differential probability PD used to 
obtained subkey bitsKj j to Kss is equal to (~)3X{~)2 . The num/,ber of plaintext I 
. 16 16 
, 
ciphertext pairs required to recover the partial subkey bits suc~essfully is given 
by N PC = vi Po ' where N PC is the number of plaintext ciphertext required and v is a 
small constant factor [16]. 
Once an R-l round differential characteristic is determined with high probability, 
the last round partial subkey bits are recovered by partially decrypting the last round of 
cipher. So in our example the target partial last round subkey bits areK5 .5 to K5,8' For 
each guess of the target subkey bits, a counter variable is incremented each time the 
difference to the last round of cipher is consistent with the characteristic. The differential 
characteristic is tested for a large number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs N pc. The 
correct partial subkey will have maximum value for the counter variable. An incorrect 
key will be equivalent to the random guess and has very low probability. Hence the 
correct partial subkey bits is given by probability 
Po = count I N pc • (2.8) 
It is expected that, for the correct target partial subkey, the value of PD calculated from 
Equation (2.8) should be close to the theoretical value of Po calculated as the product of 
the differential probabilities of he active S-boxes. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis are effective attacks on block 
ciphers. In order to provide the security against linear and differential cryptanalysis, S-
boxes should be carefully selected (i.e. they should not have high biJses or differential 
probabilities) and the cipher structure must necessitate a large number of active S-boxes 
in the attack. For example, the AES design uses an S-box and SPN structure in its cipher 
construction which is resistive to linear and differential attacks. In the next chapter, we 
will look into number of algorithms that have been studied and developed related to the 
analysis of linear and differential cryptanalysis of block ciphers. The objective of the 
algorithms is to find the best linear approximation and differential characteristic for the 
block cipher structure. 
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Chapter 3 
Analysis and Implementation of Algorithms 
This chapter reviews a number of algorithms that have 'been studied and 
, 
developed by us related to linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis. These 
algorithms find the best bias or differential probability for a block cipher and a 
corresponding linear approximation or differential characteristic. The first algorithm to be 
studied is an algorithm developed by Matsui [24] , in which he found the best linear 
approximation probability or differential probability of the DES cipher. His approach 
provided motivation to find a tool and developed an algorithm that finds the best linear 
approximation and differential characteristic of a block cipher structure like a 
Substitution Permutation Network (SPN). Such an algorithm can be used as a tool to 
analyze the effectiveness of the attacks against SPNs, and thereby improve the design and 
selection of cipher components. 
In the first section, a Depth First Search (DFS) algorithm is discussed. The search 
for the best path within the cipher structure should have minimum time complexity. For 
all the algorithms discussed in this chapter the searching mechanism is DFS based and 
the algorithms discussed are similar except that they differ in the pruning mechanism and 
the decision criterion for optimizing the running time of the algorithm. 
In the second section, the approach used by Matsui in finding the best linear 
approximation of the DES cipher is discussed. In later sections, original algorithms 
developed related to the SPN structure are introduced. The algorithms that are developed 
by us are given below: 
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1. Intelligent Pruning Mechanism (IPM) using DFS Algorithm 
2. Modified Matsui (MM) Algorithm 
3. Two-Round Iterative (TRI) Algorithm 
In each section, algorithm is described along with the advant4es and limitations 
of the approach. Some preliminary results are also shown to strengltlen the viewpoint. 
Pseudocode, figures and tables are shown when necessary to explain the algorithms more 
clearly and precisely. 
3.1 Depth First Search (DFS) Algorithm 
In this section, the function of the Depth First Search (DFS) algorithm is 
discussed before considering its implementation in algorithms developed for SPNs. DFS 
broadly operates on a directed graph or an undirected graph [25]. A tree structure is a 
way of representing the hierarchical nature of a structure in a graphical fonn. Every finite 
tree structure has a member called the root node that is the topmost node in the hierarchy 
of the tree structure. A node is the "parent" of another node if it is one step higher in the 
hierarchy and closer to root node. A node is the "sibling" of other nodes if it shares the 
same parent node. A node is called a "child" node if it is connected to a parent node and 
is one level lower in the hierarchy than a parent node. The purpose of branches is to 
connect pairs of nodes in a tree structure. The objective of DFS is to search through all 
the nodes in a tree structure by starting at the root node. DFS is a search that advances by 
expanding the first child node of the search tree that appears and thus going deeper and 
deeper until a goal node is found, or until it hits a node that has no children. Then the 
search backtracks, returning to the most recent node it had not finished exploring [26]. 
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The overall complexity of the execution time of the DFS algorithm is 
0(1 V 1 + I E I) where V represents the set of nodes and E represents the set of branches 
in the graph [26]. Therefore it is of linear order in terms of the number of nodes and the 
) 
number of branches. Since the complexity of a search cannot be better'than a linear order, 
this search procedure will be an optimal one if it is necessary to vi~if all nodes in the 
search of the graph. However if the number of nodes is large (e.g. 268 ) the searching 
mechanism can still be slow. The searching mechanism can be made to run faster by 
avoiding the visit of some nodes, if it is certain that the desired infonnation is not present 
there. The general pseudo code for the DFS algorithm is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Procedure Round~ I: 
BEGIN 
FOR all nodes w DO 
array[w]= 0 
parent[w]=NULL 
END FOR 
FOR all nodes w DO 
II initialize all node unvisited 
II initialize all parent of tree as NULL 
IF array[w] = = 0 THEN call Procedure DFS(w) 
EXIT 
Procedure DFS(node w): 
Visit (w) II traversing a node 
array[w]=l II node visited so change the flag 
FOR all node v adjacent to w DO 
IF array[ v]= = 0 THEN /I check if sibling visited 
parent[v]=w 
call Procedure DFS(v) 
END IF 
END FOR 
END Procedure 
Figure 3.1: General Pseudocode for DFS Algorithm [26] 
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In this thesis we consider the basic SPN architecture for finding the maximum 
probability to be used in differential cryptanalysis and the maximum bias as applicable to 
linear cryptanalysis. In our algorithms, the nature ~! the use of DFS is to find optimal 
branches through all layers of the tree such that some branches and n~es do not need to 
be visited if they are clearly not optimal. This we call pruning. Herlc~ pruning tries to 
reduce search space within the tree structure. When any of the algorithms that are 
discussed in the thesis are executed on, an implicit tree structure is formed. Each node in 
the tree structure is equivalent to rx. for linear cryptanalysis and 6X for differential 
cryptanalysis, where i is the round number of the SPN and rx. /!lX. represent the linear 
mask/difference of the input to a round. Each layer in the tree structure symbolizes the 
corresponding round number for the SPN. The purpose of a DFS algorithm is to search 
the branches through each layer of the tree structure to find where the optimal solution 
resides. In the case of linear cryptanalysis, an optimal solution is an approximation with 
the maximum bias. For differential cryptanalysis, an optimal solution is a characteristic 
with the maximum probability. If DFS traverses through all nodes in the tree structure 
then the order of complexity with respective to number of nodes is approximately equal 
to 2"'x.o • such that there are 2'" nodes in each round and n is the number of rounds 
involved in the approximation. 
3.2 Matsui's Algorithm on DES 
Matsui exploited the Feistel structure [10] of DES and developed a practical 
algorithm that can be used in attacking or analyzing the resistance of DES using linear 
and differential cryptanalysis [24]. In his work, Matsui makes use of induction to find the 
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best n -round probability' Bn from the knowledge of best i -round probabilities B; 
(1 ~ j ~ n -I) [24]. The algorithm by nature is recursive. In his algorithm, Matsui uses 
greedy approach and pruning mechanism. The greooy approach trie~ to find the good 
approximation I characteristic while searching in the tree structure. BJsides that, pruning 
tries to reduce search space within the tree structure by avoiding a visit to the branches 
and nodes that will clearly be not optimal. The pseudocode for the algorithm is presented 
in [24]. 
Matsui's results show that his approach is good enough to get the best probability 
[24] in good time for the DES structure, but this approach will not necessarily yield the 
best probability efficiently for other block cipher structures such as SPNs. A modified 
version of Matsui's approach for the SPN structure discussed in Section 3.4 proves the 
above claim. 
3,3 Intelligent Pruning Mechanism (IPM) using DFS Algorithm 
In the next section, we will consider the modified version of Matsui's approach to 
SPNs, but we first consider a straight-forward application of a DFS based algorithm using 
a greedy approach. The algorithm finds the best linear approximation or best differential 
characteristics for the SPNs. This algorithm basically uses a greedy based approach and a 
pruning mechanism while searching the tree structure using DFS so that branches leading 
to suboptimal solutions can be avoided. The breadth of the tree structure searched grows 
dramatically with the increase in number of rounds, size of S-boxes and block size. 
I For simplicity we shalilypically refer to "probability" when discussing the algorithms, where, in the case 
of linear cryptanalysis, this refers to "bias", and for differential cryptanalysis, this refers to the differential 
probability. 
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In this section, discussion of the algorithm is in the context of linear cryptanalysis. 
Similar concepts can be applied using differential cryptanalysis. The two key aspects that 
are incorporated in the algorithm are the greedy ~I!proach and the intelligent pruning 
mechanism. The term greedy approach in the context of the algori~m determines the 
order of the branches to be searched while the intelligent pruning met~anism determines 
when branches are too bad to be considered for further searching in the algorithm, based 
on a conditional check. In other words, in order to reduce the number of search 
operations and avoid unnecessary traversing of nodes and branches within the tree 
structure, the intelligent pruning mechanism is used to find the best bias of the network as 
soon as possible. 
The greedy aspect is applied on the substitution block because it produces the 
non-linearity in the system. During the linear cryptanalysis, each input to an mXm S-hox 
has 2'" possible output combinations, to select as branches that lead to further searching. 
The greedy approach of our algorithm basically considers the arrangement of these 
masking output bits from the S-box with respect to the masking input bits and the active 
S-hox involved during such transfonnation. If the masked output bits lead to the right 
solution quickly, then the solution is achieved with fewer search operations. Thus in our 
algorithm, we try to find the appropriate (rx;> r~) value from the bias-table for each 
round i using a greedy approach, so that the resulting solution of n rounds is the best one. 
The greedy approach is useful because it helps to find the maximum bias by minimizing 
active S-boxes (Hamming weight) and maximizing S-box bias value (bias-table). The two 
greedy approaches for the selection criteria of rY; for the output bits of an S-box that are 
used in the algorithm by us are listed below: 
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I. For a given S-box, firstly arrange OUlput values r1'; from the bias-table for a 
given input value rXj in descending order of bias, and then arrangerr; of same 
bias based on Hamming weight2 ofry, in ascending order. 
, 
2. For a given S-box, firstly arrange output values ry, from the bias-table based on 
Hamming weight for a given input value rXj in ascending order, and then 
arrange rr; of same Hamming weight based on bias in descending order. 
The intelligent pruning mechanism used in the algorithm tests the boundary 
condition 
(3.1) 
and acts accordingly. In the boundary condition notation PI signifies the bias of the j'1t 
round,2" .... corresponds to maximum possible bias for the n-i round and B" is the current 
estimate of the best n-round bias. If the boundary condition is false, the algorithm avoids 
the search further down the hierarchical tree structure because the best solution does not 
reside in that space. 
Another important intelligent pruning mechanism used in the algorithm is the 
reduction in the number of branches at the root of the tree structure. This means that if 
not all masking input-output pair combinations are searched, then the search time can be 
reduced significantly. Hence, in round one, for all possible candidates for output 
combinations rt; , the maximum bias is found by looking at the bias-table. If there is 
more than one rx I then only one rx I is used, as other values can be found by looking at 
r~ and the bias PI. (The explanation in this paragraph is in context of linear 
1 Hamming weight is referred to the number of input I output bits active 
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cryptanalysis.) In the case of differential cryptanalysis, the bias-table is replaced by the 
difference-table and r~ and rXj are replaced by ..6.~ and AXj respectively. The 
pruning approach discussed here is used not only in.the [PM algorithm but also used in 
I 
the MM algorithm for SPN and the TRI algorithm, which will be" discussed in later 
sections. 
Both the greedy approaches give the same final result theoretically and practically 
but the motive is to investigate which one of the two greedy approaches gives the result 
faster for a given network and S-box. The pseudocodes of the algorithms for the linear 
and differential cryptanalysis are shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, respectively. The 
inputs to the algorithms are the network structure and the S-box properties. The output of 
the algorithms is B,., the estimate of current n-round bias / differential probability. The 
pseudocode can also be modified to keep track of the actual approximation 
characteristic. The notations that are used in the pseudo code are explained below: 
• Variable n is equal to R-l, where R is the total number of rounds in the cipher 
structure. This is because, as discussed in chapter 2, the attacks work by finding 
the best linear approximation or differential characteristic for R-I rounds. 
p; = (rXprr) is the bias of the jill round for the linear cryptanalysis using the 
piling-up lemma. 
p; = (AX; • ..6..t;) is the probability of the e" round for differential cryptanalysis. 
• [PI'P2.PJ •... 'PN ] is computed as n-round bias for the linear cryptanalysis using 
the piling-up lemma and as n-round differential probability for the differential 
cryptanalysis. 
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• rx; = perm(rY;_I) represents the permutation of the mask for the output bits of 
round i -1 for linear cryptanal ysis. 
• !lX, = perm(tlY;_I) represents the permutatiQn of the difference for the output 
) 
bits of round i -I for the differential cryptanalysis. 
p" = max ry(rX", ry) is the probability calculated as the magnitude of the 
maximum value of the masking output bits for a given masking input bits rx". 
p" =maxAy(MII,tly) is the probability calculated as the magnitude of the 
maximum value of the difference output bits for a given difference input bits 
Z", equal to Z"-'x l{max(rX ,rYj/Zm}I ,where max(rX,rYjis the maximum 
value in the bias-table for the linear cryptanalysis. For differential cryptanalysis, 
Z" .... equal to max(.1.X ,.1Y)/2m from the difference-table. 
• Term B" is the current estimate of the maximum n -round bias I differential 
probability of the cipher, Bn . 
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Procedure Round I 
BEGIN 
B. ~O 
FOR each candidate for rX j and r~ DO 
p, ~ (rx,.n;) 
IF [p"Z._,l;' B. THEN call Procedure Round (i) 
END FOR 
EXIT 
Procedure Round (i) 
FOR each candidate for rY; DO 
rx, ~ perm(rY,_,) 
p,~(rX"ry,) 
IF [P" P,. P, •.. p"Z._,l;' B. THEN call Procedure Round (i+I) 
END FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round (n) 
rx. ~ perm(ry._,) 
P. ~max,,(rX •• rY) 
IF [P"P,.P, ... P.l;,B. THEN B. ~[p"P,.P, ... p.l 
RETURN 
i' 
Figure 3.2: Pseudocode for IPM Algorithm for Linear Cryptanalysis. 
The greedy selection criteria are examined on an SPN network consisting of 6 
rounds of4x4 S-boxes as shown in Figure 3.4. This is Cipher-A as discussed in Chapter 
2. The DES S-box is used for the study is given in Table 2.1. For an SPN, the linear 
cryptanalyst requires a R-I round approximation to mount a linear attack successfully, 
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where R is the number of rounds in the cipher. Hence the result of computation for 5 
rounds is presented, as the overall cipher has 6 rounds. 
Procedure Round I 
BEGIN 
Bo =0 
FOR each candidate for M , and ,1.y, DO 
p,=(MI',1.Y,) 
IF [PI' Zo_' 1 2: Bo THEN call Procedure Round (i) 
END FOR 
EXIT 
Procedure Round (i) 
FOR each candidate for ,1.1; DO 
M , = perm(,1.Y,_,) 
p, =(M" ,1.1;) 
IF [Pl'P"P" .. p"Zo_, l2:Bo THEN call Procedure Round (i+l) 
END FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round (n) 
M o = perm(,1.Yo_') 
Po =max,,(Mo ',1.y) 
IF [Pl'P" P" .. P.l2:B;" THEN B;" =[Pl'p"p,,· ·Pol 
RETURN 
Figure 3.3: Pseudocode for IPM Algorithm for Differential Cryptanalysis. 
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subkey(K,) ] 
Round 
SUbkeY(K , ) ] 
Round 
c:~~~::::~~~::::::~~~::::::~~~~subkey(K6 ) 
Figure 3.4: Linear Approximation of SPN Consisting of 6 Rounds of4x4 S-boxes. 
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0 0 3 
3 0 0 
9 0 0 
9 0 0 
8 0 0 
3 
3 
9 
0 
0 
I' 
Table 3.1: Tabular Representation of Lirle:rr Approximation 
for Cipher-A. 
Table 3.1 is the representation of Figure 3.4 in tabular form. All the active S-
boxes in Figure 3.4 are shaded, which is equivalent to each cell in the table that has non-
zero values. All the non-zero values in the table, in hexadecimal form are equivalent to 
the inputs going to the active S-boxes, where the leftmost bit represents the most 
significant bit. For example in round I , two dark input lines going into S-box S" and S" 
in binary are equivalent to 0011, which in table form can be viewed in row one column 3 
and column 4, respectively, and is represented by hexadecimal value 3. Table 3.1 and 
Figure 3.4 shows the actual masking input and output bits involved for each round along 
with the active S-boxes in order to obtain the maximum bias value for the network. Since 
tabular form is more convenient than the figure representation, in OUf work results will be 
shown in tabular form except where figure representation is necessary. The tabular 
representation applies similar to differential cryptanalysis. 
There can be more than one linear approximation to get the same bias in SPN 
architecture. For the 6-round cipher, the maximum bias B, is equal to 0.0 1483. The 
maximum value for any active S-box is equal to 6, which is obtained from the bias-table 
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of the S-box. In the above case, there are 8 active S-boxes that yield this result. For 
both greedy approaches, the same result is obtained and the result is optimal (i.e. the best 
bias is detennined). However due to the nature of the S-box and small network 
architecture there is not much time difference for the two greedy aPll~oaches. There can 
be significant time difference if a more realistically sized cipher comisting of 8 rounds 
, 
of8x8 S-boxes is considered. We will discuss this further in the subsequent paragraphs. 
In Table 3.2, we present the best 7 round linear approximation for an 8 round of 
Cipher-B. Again each rectangle that is not equal to zero represents an active S-box while 
non-zero values correspond to the inputs in each round. Each row symbolizes a cipher 
round. The maximum bias value E, of the network is 4.5e-73. The results are achieved 
by running the TRI algorithm for SPN that will be discussed and implemented in the 
Section 3.6. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 37 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 Table 3.2: Tabular Representation of 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Linear Approximation for Cipher-B. 
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 
The algorithm discussed in Section 3.3 cannot be used in this case because the 
network size is too large and the execution time of algorithm increases dramatically. The 
3 "eX" to represent lOx 
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purpose of showing the above result is that a better result can be achieved if the behavior 
of the S-box and the cipher structure is known. In the above case, the maximum value in 
the bias table is 32 when the Hamming weight of ~e output bits is greater than 2. But a 
) 
better overall bias value is obtained when Hamming weight of output bits is one and has a 
maximum value of 18. If the first greedy approach is used then in r'o~nd two there will 
be at least 3 active S-boxes initially which will eventually result in very low B. and large 
number of active S-boxes for the overall cipher structure. (Hence, a good estimate for B" 
is obtained slowly because the masking output bits have low biases when Hamming 
weight is equal to one.) This will deteriorate the searching mechanism as the number of 
nodes in the tree structure increases dramatically and the probability that the search is in 
the right direction is low. However, if the second greedy approach is employed then a 
good estimate for B" is achieved quickly and the search can be expedited rapidly. The 
result suggests that maximum bias of Cipher-B is attained when the Hamming weight of 
the output bits is low and, as a result, less number of active S-boxes is required. Hence 
we will use the second greedy approach for all of our algorithms. 
Although the result obtained using the !PM algorithm is optimal, its execution 
time is still large even after using the above greedy approach and pruning mechanism. 
For the larger networks, the resulting execution time for the algorithm is prohibitive. 
3.4 Modified Matsui (MM) Algorithm 
Matsui ' s recursive algorithm [24] cannot be used in SPN structures as it is, due to 
the distinct nature of the DES and SPN structures. Even though both are block cipher 
structures, in DES, substitution and permutation operate only on half of the block at a 
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time. On the other hand, in the SPN architecture, substitution and permutation operate on 
the whole block at once. Figure 3.5 and 3.6 presents the pseudocode of Matsui's 
algorithm modified to operate on SPNs for linear and differential cryptanalysis, 
respectively. The pseudocode for the linear and differential cases J almost the sarne 
except for the difference in the test condition for Procedure Rountl; I and Procedure 
Round- i. In the linear case, the test condition or boundary condition given by 
(3.2) 
is governed by the piling-up lemma, while in the differential case, the boundary 
condition given by Equation (3.2) is the product of probabilities of the individual rounds. 
The modified Matsui approach is somewhat better than the !PM algorithm discussed in 
Section 3.3 because it has a close boundary condition as stated above. On the other hand 
in the !PM algorithm, the boundary condition given by (3.1) is not a close boundary 
condition because it has no knowledge of best n -I rounds linear biases (or similarly 
differential probabilities). However, the MM algorithm uses the sarne greedy approach as 
!PM and the same first round simplifications as !PM. 
In the !PM algorithm, the boundary condition is not true until the search reaches 
far down in the tree structure. Hence, it is not as efficient as the MM algorithm. While 
both of the algorithms discussed guarantee the best n round linear biases and differential 
probabilities, they are limited in their practicality because of the large execution time for 
large networks. 
The notations used in the pseudocode have the meaning as mentioned in Section 
3.3. In the algorithm the term B" represents the current estimate of the maximum n-
round bias / differential probability of cipher, B" . Note that the determination of B" 
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requires the previous determination of B,,_l . Hence, the algorithm iteratively computes 
the best bias I probability for approximation I characteristics of increasing number of 
rounds. 
Procedure Round I 
BEGIN 
B, =O 
FOR each candidate for rx, and n ; DO 
p, =(rX"n; ) 
IF [p, .B,_,l;" B, THEN call Procedure Round (i) 
END FOR 
EXIT 
Procedure Round (i) 
FOR each candidate for ry, DO 
rX i = penn(ry,_, ) 
Pi = (rx"ry,) 
IF [P" P, .P,. .• p" B,-; l;" B, THEN call Procedure Round (i+I) 
END FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round (n) 
rx, = penn(rY,_,) 
p, =maxrr(rX,. ry) 
IF [p" P,. P, •..• p, l ;" B, THEN B, =[p" P, .P, .· .• p,l 
RETURN 
Figure 3.5: Pseudocode for MM Algorithm for Linear Cryptanalysis 
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Procedure Round I 
B"=O 
BEGIN 
FOR each candidate for <iX1 and Al; DO 
PI = (<iXI'Al;) 
IF [pI'B"_ll" B" THEN call Procedure Round (i) 
END FOR 
EXIT 
Procedure Round (i) 
FOR each candidate for Al; DO 
<iXi = penn(AY,_I) 
Pi = (<iX"AY,) 
IF [PI' P" p" .,p"B"_i l" B" THEN call Procedure Round (i+I) 
END FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round (n) 
<iX" = penn( AY"_I ) 
p" = max. y(<iX", AY) 
IF [PI'P"P" ., p"l" B" THEN B" =[PI' P"P" .,pJ 
RETURN 
I' 
Figure 3.6: Pseudocode for MM Algorithm for Differential Cryptanalysis 
3,5 Limitations, Issues Encountered for the First Two Algorithms 
Both the !PM and the MM approach in the SPN architecture have their own 
limitations. The complexity of both the algorithms increases considerably with the 
increase in the number of rounds and the number of active S-boxes in each round. While 
working on the smaller 16-bit SPN architecture (Cipher-A), the algorithms ceases to give 
the result for the structures that have greater than 8 rounds in reasonable amount of time. 
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This result is not surprising because the DFS algorithm has to traverse most of the nodes 
and branches to make sure that result obtained is the best one. The greedy based approach 
cannot make a good decision for the best result after.~very round until it gets a better bias 
. ., 
after scanning the whole cipher structure in the case of IPM. Hence it has to run almost 
all the way down the structure to make a decision. The MM algorithrri ,also suffers from 
the same problem. Hence these two approaches are not efficient for larger networks. 
Despite these issu~s, preliminary investigation on the l6-bit SPN architecture 
using the above two approaches gives some indication that the best result is acquired 
when a small number of S-boxes is involved in the linear approximation or differential 
cryptanalysis. Such a result can be viewed, for example, from Table 3.1 where, for the 5 
round linear approximation out of 20 S-boxes just 8 active S-boxes are needed to get the 
best result. Hence, the experimental results signals that some logical constraints may be 
put on the searching mechanism so that result is attained at good pace. 
Given the aforementioned realizations, design objectives for a new algorithm 
were determined: 
1. Pruning during the search should be improved by using some strict constraints so 
that it can be used for ciphers of more than 8 rounds, i.e., larger, more secure 
cipher structures. 
2. The algorithm should be scalable to a large network such as 64-bit SPN structure 
based on 8x8 S-boxes and the 64-bit SPN structure based4x4 on S-boxes. 
3. Complexity of the algorithm should be reduced from a potential exponential 
factor to some linear factor when the number of rounds is increased. 
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" In order to meet the above design objectives the two algorithms discussed in 
Sections 3.3 and Section 3.4 requires modification. The searching mechanism can be 
improved or speedup with respect to SPN structure in the following ways: 
1. Put constraints on the number of active S-boxes in each round} 
2. Find the maximum linear bias or differential probability value rapidly so that 
unnecessary branches can be eliminated. 
3. Carefully limit the number of S-boxes for the first round and intelligently chooses 
masking input-output pairs or difference input-output pairs from the bias-table or 
difference-table such that overall result can be maximized. 
4. Examine how closely the practical result is near to theoretical upper bound. The 
upper bound occurs when each round has one S-box and the maximum bias / 
probability value from the bias table / difference-table. 
5. Efficiently implement the inner sub procedures of algorithm so that it reduces the 
overall complexity of the algorithm. 
3.6 Two-Round Iterative (TRI) Algorithm 
Considering the factors as stated in Section 3.5, a new algorithm has been 
developed that incorporates most of the above features. After studying the bias table in 
linear analysis or difference-table in differential analysis and the SPN architecture we 
found out that if we reduce the calculation in early rounds we can save lots of trivial 
search. So the new algorithm collects some good results after intelligently pruning the 
first two rounds, then uses these results to determine good results for the outcome of the 
next two rounds. These results are then used for the next two rounds and the process 
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continues to derive good results for the outcome of n rounds. Therefore the approach is 
divided into several steps with each step being of similar complexity. In total there are 
n 12 steps and hence the algorithm is linear in the nu~ber of rounds n. 
) 
This approach really fits the objective and serves the purposa of getting a good 
result in superior time. This approach is also a greedy based approacl' except that the 
search aggressively prunes branches of the tree with the potential of producing a non-
optimal result. That is, while it is expected that the result will be a good linear bias or 
differential probability, it is not guaranteed to be the best. The overall bias probability or 
differential probability is found by collecting some good biases or probabilities after 
every two rounds. Then decisions are made by using these biases or probabilities 
assuming that it will lead to the best results after the next two rounds. 
The intuition behind the approach is to collect a list of close to optimal results 
after every two rounds, i.e., the list of results obtained after round 2, are used to calculate 
good results after round 4. The process is iteratively repeated after every two rounds until 
the good result is obtained after n rounds. The assumption in the approach is that by 
biasing the result for n, on good results for n-2, the overall result will be good, if not 
optimal. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the results obtained using this approach gives good 
biases or probabilities for n round linear approximation or differential characteristics. 
We refer to this algorithm as the Two-Round Iterative or TRI algorithm. The 
division of number of rounds in a cipher structure in the algorithm is discussed by an 
example. Suppose a 10 round SPN cipher structure is available. As per the previous 
knowledge, a linear attack requires a 9 round approximation to mount an attack 
successfully. Hence nine rounds are divided in four 2 rounds plus the last 1 round. The 
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last round is separate because of its different nature in decision making when compared 
to the previous rounds. On the other hand, if the number of rounds in the cipher is odd 
then in the last two rounds the decision criterion is d}!ferent from the previous rounds. 
) 
The algorithm is illustrated in the context of Cipher-A. The fl'ur input bits of an 
S-box gives 4 output bits in Cipher-A. So the S-box has Hamming we\ght of output bits 
and input bits from 0 to 4. In round one, the maximum bias value or maximum 
differential probability from the bias-table or difference-table is found for a given 
masking or a difference output-input pair for all possible combinations of Hamming 
weight 0 to 4. The purpose is basically to run the algorithm from round two and minimize 
the searching for masking or difference input-output pairs for round one as discussed in 
Section 3.3. If the above work is not done then it will involve 216 possible masking or 
difference inputs before making a decision for the good result in round one. A good 
masking or difference output value of round one is used as masking or difference input 
for round two after the permutation. The bias values or differential probabilities are not 
affected by the permutation block. The searching is done intelligently using these values 
in round two. A sorted array is stored that contains good masking or difference inputs and 
their corresponding biases or probabilities after every two rounds. The sorted array size 
should be large enough to make a good decision for the next two rounds. Assuming odd 
n, the same procedure is repeated upto n-l rounds with good linear biases or differential 
probabilities are stored in a sorted array. However, in the last round n the maximum bias 
or differential probability is calculated for a given masking or difference input-output 
pair. A good bias or probability obtained quickly in round n then becomes the decision 
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criteria for the rest of the rx" or /!J{" values. After all rx" or /!J{" values are 
exhausted, a good approximation of B" is made. 
The idea of an array is to include good solutions for the sub ~roblem. The array 
is sorted so that the good biases or differential probabilities reside at'the lower index in 
I 
the array. The resulting sorted array helps to facilitate the searching for a good 
approximation / characteristic after the next 2 rounds .. The sorted array should be large 
enough so that optimal solution has a good chance of remaining in the set. 
The pseudo code for the TRI algorithm with respect to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis is given in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8, respectively. The greedy approach 
and the intelligent pruning used in TRI algorithm are same as the !PM algorithm. 
However, number of active S-boxes is constraint to maximum three S-boxes per round. 
This is done to get the good result in practical time as not many S-boxes are involved per 
round during the linear and differential cryptanalysis. The inputs to the algorithms are the 
network structure and the S-box properties. The outputs of the algorithms are the bias / 
differential probability and the corresponding linear approximation / differential 
characteristic. 
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Two·Round lIerative Algorithm: 
BEGIN 
i:O, B:,:O 
FOR ISkSn DO 
FOR ISj S L DO 
C.[j] =0 
ENOFOR 
ENOFOR 
WHILEi<n 
IF (i = 0) THEN call Procedure FirstRound 0 
IF (i + 2) > n THEN call Procedure Round (n) 
IF(i +2) = n THEN call Procedure Round-even (n·l) 
ELSE call Procedure Round (1+ 1) 
1=1+2 
ENOWHll..E 
EXIT 
Procedure FirstRound () 
FOR each candidate for rr; DO 
p, = max lT(rX ,rr,) 
rx, = rx I p, =(rX,rr;) 
IF [PI'Z.--lJ~B:, THEN 
rx 1 = penn(rr;) 
FOR each candidate for rr1 DO 
PI = (rXI, rr1 ) 
IF [P"Pl]~ smallest bias in C1 THEN 
INSERT [p"p)] in CI 
INSERT rx, in D,'. rr; in D, ~ 
INSERT rXI in Dl" fY1 in Dl H 
ENOIF 
ENOFOR 
ENOIF 
END FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round (i) 
FOR I SjSL DO 
o=CH(j], rx, = perm(D,., "[jJ) 
FOR each candidate for rr; DO 
p, = (rx ,.rr;) 
IF [o,p"Z_, ] ~B:, THEN 
rx .. , = penn(ry;) 
FOR each candidate for fr .. , DO 
Ph' = (rX"l'fY;.,) 
IF [O,PI'P",)~ smallest bias in C"l THEN 
INSERT [O,P"P",] in C,., 
INSERT rx, in D,'. n; in DI" 
INSERT fXI+! in D .. ,', rrlo, in D1., H 
ENOIF 
END FOR 
END IF 
ENOFOR 
END FOR 
RETURN 
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Procedure Round (n) 
FOR ISj:SL DO 
6=C ... ,U], rX.=pmn(Do-,"[jJ) 
P.=maxn'(rx., ry) 
n, :TY I p. ",(rx., ry) 
IF [o'P. J 2:~ THEN B:" =[6,p. 1 
IF [8,p. J2: smallest bias in C, THEN 
INSERT [o,p.l in C. 
INSERT rx, in D.', n . in D. H 
END IF 
El\'D FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round-even (i) 
FOR I Sj:S L DO 
8=CH U], rx,= DI-J "[j ] 
FOR each candidate for n; DO 
p,=(rX" ry,) 
IF ro,p"Z,J2:B:" mEN 
rx;., = pmn(rr, ) 
PI., =maxn'(rx,.,.ry) 
rYf<.1 = ry I P,., = (rxw r y) 
IF [.5,p"pl+,l2:B:" THEN B. = [a,PI. p,.,1 
IF [O,P" P;,,] 2: smallest bias in C. THEN 
INSERT [o.p"p;.,l in C. 
INSERT rX I ill D._I'. r r, in Do-, H 
INSERT rx l<, in D.', rYI+1 in D. H 
ENDlF 
END IF 
ENOFOR 
END FOR 
RETURN 
j' 
Figure 3.7: Pseudocode for TRI Algorithm for Linear Cryptanalysis 
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Two-Round Iterative Algorithm: 
BEGIN 
i;:(), B. =0 
FOR iSkSn DO 
FOR ISj:SL DO 
C,Ul=O 
END FOR 
END FOR 
WHILEi<n 
IF (j = 0) THEN call Procedure FirstRound 0 
IF (i + 2):> n THEN call Procedure Round (n) 
IF(i+2)=n THEN call Procedure Round-even (n-1) 
ELSE call Procedure Round (1+1) 
;=i+2 
ENDWHll..E 
EXIT 
Procedure FirstRound 0 
FOR each candidate for 6Y, DO 
P, =mal[.u(6X • .6.Y,) 
M,=I!X I p,=(6X • .6.Y,) 
IF [PI'Z.-IJ~B. THEN 
6X. = penn(6Y,) 
FOR each candidate for 6Y, DO 
PI =(M,.aY.) 
IF [pl,Pll~ small~tbiasin Cl THEN 
lNSERT [P"P.] in C1 
lNSERT!!X, in D,', 6Y, in 0,· 
INSERT IlX j in D1 ', 6)', in D,N 
END IF 
END FOR 
END IF 
END FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round (0 
FOR ISj :SL DO 
r5 = CI-,[jj, !lX, = penn(D, ... "[jJ) 
FOR each candidate for At; DO 
PI=(MI'6.Y,) 
IF (0, P"Z ... .,l 2: B. THEN 
'"' .. , '" perm(6Y,) 
FOR each candidate for 6Y .. , DO 
PI.,=(IU',.,,6Y,.,) 
IF [t5,pi,pl<,l2: smallest bias in e", THEN 
INSERT [J,p"P;.,] in C,.., 
INSERT M, in V,' • .o.Y, in D. ~ 
INSERT 11X.,.. in 0,..' • .o.Y". in D.,. ~ 
END IF 
END FOR 
END IF 
END FOR 
END FOR 
RETURN 
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Procedure Round (n) 
FOR l S;jS;L DO 
6=C .... ,[j], tlX.:perm(D_I~[j]) 
P. '" max .. r(tlX.,6.y) 
6.Y.=.6.Y I p. =(M.,6.y) 
IF [o,P,J2:B. THEN B. =[o,p, l 
IF lt5,p, l2: smallest bias ill C. THEN 
INSERT [o,p, l in C. 
INSERT M . in D.', toy. in D." 
ENOIF 
END FOR 
RETURN 
Procedure Round-even (I) 
FOR l :Sj:SL DO 
,,= C,_,[jj, !lX, = DJ-! NUl 
FOR each candidate for l!.Y, DO 
p, ,,,(M, . .6.Y,) 
IF (6,p"Z,)2:B, THEN 
Mi., =jU'nn(.1.y,) 
P,., =max .. r(M,.!,6.y) 
6.Y", =.6.Y I Plo' = (tlX,. ,,6.y) 
IF [6,p"p,., l 2: B. THEN B. =[a,p"p,. ,] 
IF [o,p"p;.,l2: smallesl bias in C, THEN 
INSERT [O,P" P;,,] in C. 
INSERT 6>:, in 0 .... ,'. toY, in D_I " 
INSERT M ;'I in D.' • .0.1';., in D, H 
END IF 
ENOIF' 
END FOR 
ENOFOR 
RETURN 
" 
Figure 3.8: Pseudocode for TRI Algorithm for Differential Cryptanalysis 
Most of the notations used in the above pseudocode have the same meaning as 
cited in Section 3.3. Some new notations that are used explicitly for the above pseudo 
code are discussed below. 
Ci •• is a sorted array of size L. The value of L should be large enough to collect 
good bias I probability for i+! rounds and is ideally large enough to include the 
66 
" 
partial optimal solution. C,<, is always sorted in ascending order. If the array is 
full and the new value is larger than smallest value in the array, then the new 
value is inserted into the appropriate position.within the array. 
D,,,' is an array of size L. The array collects the masking'1 difference input 
values for active S-boxes of round i+l corresponding to biases!/ probabilities in 
array Ci+1 -
D,' is an array of size L. It collects the masking I difference input values for 
active S-boxes of round i. These values help in backtracking the masking inputs 
and the active S-boxes when the n-round bias I probability is found and the 
corresponding linear approximation I differential characteristic is to be 
determined. 
D," and D,,," represents output masking I difference value corresponding to D,' 
and Di+!' respectively. 
INSERT operation inserts the value, if appropriate, into the appropriate position 
in the array. 
In Chapter 4, we will study the effects of varying the array size L. 
3.7 Advantages of TRI Algorithm 
In this section, the advantages of the TRI algorithm over the IPM and MM 
algorithm are discussed. The complexity of algorithm increases linearly with the increase 
in the number of rounds. This is a significant achievement with this algorithm. As a 
result, we can get good results for the number of rounds greater than 8. In fact, we can 
analyze highly secure ciphers that include a large number of rounds. The search is 
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reduced drastically because the tree search is performed only on maximum two rounds; 
hence number of nodes contributing in the tree structure is reduced. The searching for 
masking or difference input-output pair in round ~lne is reduced as the algorithm is 
. ) 
executed from round two by exploiting the properties of S-box frolll the bias-table or 
difference-table. As a result, the algorithm is scalable to large network;'l!ke Cipher-B and 
Cipher-Co If the algorithm's sub procedures are implemented efficiently then the 
execution time of the algorithm can be modest, resulting in an algorithm that gives a 
result in practical time. However, this result, while good is not guaranteed to be optimal. 
In Table 3.3, a sample result for the TRI algorithm is given. The result shown in 
the table is for the linear cryptanalysis of a JO round Cipher-A. The S-box used in the 
simulation is the DES S-box is shown in Table 2.1. Table 3.3 shows active S-boxes 
along with the input values in the boxes for each round for the solution derived by the 
algorithm. 
0 0 6 0 
0 0 2 2 
3 3 3 0 
E 0 0 E 
9 9 0 0 
C 0 0 0 Table 3.3: Tabular Representation of 
0 0 8 0 10 Round Linear Approximation for 
2 0 0 0 Cipher-A using TRI Algorithm. 
8 8 8 0 
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The maximum bias value B 9 is found to be 1.466e;'l. There are total 16 active S-boxes 
. ) 
out of maximum 36 S-boxes which is approximately 44.4%. The algorithm gives a result 
, 
in approximately 20 minutes. Table 3.4 shown below reflects on bias ,value after every 
two rounds. 
Round No. Bias Value 
2 .14062 
4 .01483 Table 3.4: Tabular Representation of 
6 .00185 Intermediate Solution for Cipher-A. 
8 3.47e-4 
This approach is employed on some realistic SPN cipher structures and results are 
investigated and discussed later in the thesis in Chapter 4. By using the TRI algorithm, 
good results are achieved in practical time which may be the best result in most of the 
cases for the SPN architecture. However a drawback with TRI algorithm is that there is 
no way mathematically or practically to guarantee that the result attained is the optimal. 
Nevertheless, the algorithm is a useful tool to look into properties of S-boxes and cipher 
structures that are necessary for good cryptographic resistance to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discussed about the three algorithms: the !PM algorithm, 
the MM algorithm and the TRI algorithm. All alg~rithms were implemented for SPN 
) 
architectures by us. The limitations and advantages of the thre~ algorithms were 
discussed and preliminary results shown where necessary t6 . strengthen our 
viewpoints. In particular, the TRI algorithm was noted to be efficient and practical for 
large networks and is conjectured to be capable of determining good linear biases and 
differential probabilities and the corresponding linear approximations and differential 
characteristics. 
We can also state the worst case complexities for the rPM, MM and our TRI 
algorithms. The worst case execution time of exhaustively searching all nodes in case 
of !PM and MM algorithm is given by, 
(3.3) 
where t(N ,n) represents the worst case execution time of exhaustively searching 
nodes in !PM or MM algorithm, 2N is the maximum number of nodes in each round 
and n is the number of rounds in the approximation. On the other hand the worst case 
execution time of exhaustively searching all nodes in case of TRI algorithm is given 
by, 
t(N,n,L) E 0(2"'N + L x n) (3.4) 
where t(N ,n,L) represents the worst case execution time of exhaustively searching 
nodes in TRI algorithm and L is a sorted list after every two rounds. Hence from 
Equation (3.3) and (3.4) we can deduce that worst case execution time complexity for 
the TRI algorithm is better than !PM and MM algorithm. 
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This leads to the next chapter where results are discussed in more detail. It will be 
shown that efficiency of the TRI algorithm is indeed favorable. 
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Chapter 4 
Algorithm Results for Different Ciphers 
~ 
In this chapter. we will look at the results obtained by running the !PM algorithm. 
I 
MM algorithm and the TRI algorithm. Discussion is also given by analyzing the results 
for Cipher-A. Cipher-B and Cipher-C. 
In Section 4.1. different networks of Cipher-A. distinguished by different S-
boxes. are considered and a discussion is involved by running the optimal algorithm (!PM 
and MM) and our non-optimal algorithm (TRl). Some conclusions are drawn at the end 
of the section that strengthens our intuition to use our TRl algorithm on larger networks 
to investigate the characteristics of the ciphers with reference to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. In section 4.2. a study is made by using different networks (i.e .• different 
S-boxes) of Cipher-B and some comparisons are drawn by analyzing the results. Finally. 
in Section 4.3. we will test our algorithm on a number of different networks of Cipher-C. 
All the tables were constructed by running the algorithm on Intel Pentium 
Centrino 1.6 GHz processor with 512 MB RAM (Random Access Memory) except for 
tables obtained for Results for Cipher-C. Results for Cipher-C where obtained by running 
the algorithm on Intel Pentium4 3.0 GHz processor with 2GB RAM. The algorithms 
were implemented in Java and the environment selected was Eclipse. 
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4.1 Results for Cipher-A 
In this section, we examine the results for the 16-bit network based on 4x4 S-
boxes. The intent of studying this network is that we will analyze :the efficiency and 
• 
effectiveness of our TRI algorithm as compared to the optimal IPM anil MM algorithms. 
4.1.1 Results for Randomly Selected S-boxes 
Table 4.1 indicates the maximum values from the bias-table and the difference-
table. It is obtained for 20 different S-boxes, each corresponding to one of the Cipher-A 
networks. The S-boxes were selected by changing the input-output mapping randomly. 
The actual S-box mapping for all 20 S-boxes is given in the Appendix (Table A.I). 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, all the values in the tables are even. In 90% of 
the ciphers, the highest value from the bias-table is 6 when rx and ry are not equal to 
zero. Therefore the maximum bias value is equal to 6116. The higher the bias value for 
the linear approximation, the better will be the effectiveness of linear cryptanalysis [16]. 
A similar analogy holds true for the differential cryptanalysis. 
Cipher I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Max. value 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 
(bias-table) 
Max. value 6 4 6 6 6 6 8 10 6 6 6 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
(difference-
table) 
Table 4.1: Maximum Value in the Bias-table and Difference-table for 20 Different 
Cipher-A Networks using Random S-boxes. 
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Table 4.2 shows the bias for a 6 round linear approximation of 20 different 
Cipher-A networks using the randomly selected S-boxes. The bias values are shown for 
the optimal algorithm (IPMlMM) and for non-optil"al algorithm (TRI) with different 
I 
buffer lengths, L. As discussed in Chapter 3, the optimal algorithms c.lo not give a result 
in practical time for large number of rounds for Cipher-A. The results ~~own in Table 4.2 
are for a small 7 round Cipher-A. From the Table 4.2, we see that for 80% of the cases, 
the result of our TRI algorithm when L=4ooo is equal to the optimal result. The results 
also show that the TRI algorithm matches the bias value of the optimal algorithm even 
for 1.=100 for 60% of the time. In most cases, when the TRI algorithm does not give an 
optimal result, it still finds a good non-optimal result. Since the complexity of the linear 
cryptanalysis is inversely proportional to the square of the bias, a non-optimal result that 
is in the same order as the optimal result is still indicative of cipher's resistance to the 
attack. For example, for cipher I the bias value is equal to .00741 for L=4ooo, 1000 and 
100, which is approximately 1.05 times less than the optimal solution. Even for 1.=50 the 
result is not bad and is approximately l.l8 times less than the optimal solution. Similarly, 
for cipher 15 the factor is l.l8, which is not that significant in linear cryptanalysis. 
Overall the very low value of 1.=50, the TRI algorithm result equals the optimal solution 
for 45% of the cases and for rest of the cases the result is close to optimal. 
From Table 4.2, we can see that cipher 9 is a very weak cipher as the resulting 
bias is equal to the upper bound for the bias of a 6-round approximation with the 
corresponding S-box. That is the result that involves one S-box in each round during the 
approximation and is based on the maximum value in the bias-table. Contrary to cipher 9, 
cipher 5 is a strong cipher because it has very low bias value. From these 20 random 
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networks, we can also see the significant variation of bias value from .08898 to .00247, a 
factor of 36 which indicates a large variation in the resistance level of the ciphers. 
Cipher IPMlMM TRI TRI TRI Till (L=50) 
(Optimal) (L=4oo0) (L=loo0) (L=IOO) 
I .00781 .00741 .00741 .00741 .()(j659 
2 .00439 .00439 .00195 .00195 .00195 
3 .01178 .01178 .01178 .01178 .01\78 
4 .00989 .00988 .00988 .00988 .00988 
5 .00247 .00247 .00247 .00247 .00195 
6 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 
7 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00390 
8 .01977 .01757 .01757 .01757 .01757 
9 .08898 .08898 .08898 .08898 .08898 
\0 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 
1\ .02966 .02966 .02966 .02636 .02636 
12 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00390 
13 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 
14 .00494 .00494 .00494 .00247 .00247 
15 .00439 .00370 .00370 .00370 .00370 
16 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 
17 .00781 .00781 .00586 .00439 .00439 
18 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 
19 .00313 .00219 .00219 .00219 .00195 
20 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 .00781 
Table 4.2: Maximum Bias for 6 Round Approximation of 20 Different Cipher-A 
Networks using Random S-boxes. 
Table 4.3 shows the maximum number of active S-boxes involved during the 6 
round linear approximation of Cipher-A. From this table, we can see that for 90% of the 
cases, the total number of active S-boxes involved in 6 round approximations is less than 
or equal to 8. Hence, the average number of S-boxes per round is small and is less than 2, 
even equal to I for 60% of the cases. Table 4.3 gives an intuition that an optimal solution 
is not likely to involve a large number of active S-boxes in each round. 
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Cipher IPMlMM TRI TRI TRI TRI (L=50) 
(Optimal) (L=4000) I (L=1000) , (L=100) 
I 6 9 9 9 8 
2 7 7 8 8 8 
3 6 6 6 6 6 
4 8 8 8 ., 8 1& 
5 9 9 9 9 I ~ 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
7 6 6 6 6 1 
8 7 6 6 6 6 ' 
9 6 6 6 6 6 
10 6 6 6 6 6 
II 7 7 7 6 6 
12 6 6 6 6 6 
13 6 6 6 6 6 
14 8 8 8 10 10 
15 7 10 10 10 10 
16 6 6 6 6 6 
17 6 6 7 8 8 
18 6 6 6 6 6 
19 12 8 8 8 8 
20 6 6 6 6 6 
Table 4.3: Number of Active S-boxes Involved in 6 Round Approximation of 20 
Different Cipher-A Networks using Random S-boxes 
We can see an anomaly in cipher 19, where an optimal result involves a larger 
number of active S-boxes as compared to the non-optimal solution found by the TRI 
algorithm. The reason is that the TRI algorithm makes use of the greedy approach and 
intelligent pruning while making a decision after every two rounds as indicated in the 
details about the algorithm given in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.4 characterizes the execution time in finding the maximum bias by an 
optimal !PM and the non-optimal TRI algorithm. There is a large variation in time in 
finding the optimal solution with the time ranging from I minute to 48 minutes. If the 
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solution is found very early during the search operation then the algorithm takes much 
less time. 
Cipher IPM(Optimal) TRI (L=4000) TRI (L=lOOO) TRI (L-1OO) TRI (L=50) 
Time{min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time(min:se~) Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) 
4:00 7:00 1:20 0:35 0:23 
25:00 10:00 2:00 0:30 0:30 
2:00 4:00 1:00 0:20 0:15 
2:00 10:00 2:30 0:30 0:30 
48:00 14:00 2:00 0:40 0:30 
3:00 4:00 1:20 0:40 0:30 
3:00 10:00 1:20 0:20 0:12 
1:00 14:00 1:00 0:25 0:15 
1:00 4:00 1:00 0:10 0:06 
10 1:00 9:00 1:30 0:30 0:08 
II 1:00 5:00 1:20 0:08 0:05 
12 2:00 3:00 1:30 0:30 0:30 
13 2:00 9:00 1:20 0:30 0:30 
14 10:00 5:00 1:30 0:15 0:13 
15 13:00 8:00 1:20 0:30 0:30 
16 4:00 7:00 2:00 0:15 0:10 
17 4:00 8:00 1:20 0:30 0:25 
18 3:00 6:00 1:30 0:30 0:30 
19 40:00 10:00 2:00 0:30 0:40 
20 3:00 8:00 1:30 0:30 0:25 
Table 4.4: Execution Time Required in 6 Round Approximation of 20 Different Cipher-A 
Networks using Random S-boxes 
However if the algorithm doesn't find the optimal solution during the early phase of the 
search operation, then it has to consider many branches and nodes, which will 
significantly increase the execution time. This is the reason that the IPM algorithm ceases 
to give results in practical time when the number of rounds are increased in Cipher-A. 
The average execution time for the TRI algorithm when L=4000 is approximately 
equal to 8 minutes, and when L= I 00, it is approximately 28 seconds. Hence the execution 
time for TRI algorithm increases with the increase in the L value. But increasing L also 
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increases the probability of finding an optimal result or a close to optimal result. There is 
not much variation in time in finding the result using the TRI algorithm for a given L, 
because TRI tries to find good result after every t;:'o rounds; hence its complexity is 
linear with respect to number of rounds. 
Table 4.5 represents the differential probability for a 6 round 6~aracteristic of 20 
different Cipher-A networks using random S-boxes. The TRI algorithm gives optimal 
results in 85%, 70%, 60% and 40% of the time when L is equal to 4000, 1000, 100 and 
50 respectively. Even when the result is not optimal the value is close to optimal for 
L=4ooo. Since the complexity of the differential cryptanalysis is inversely proportional to 
the differential probability, a non-optimal result that is in the same order as the optimal 
result is still indicative of cipher' s resistance to the attack. For example, in cipher 10, the 
TRI algorithm gives approximately 1.5 times lesser value as compared to the optimal 
solution. Similarly, in cipher 18, the factor is reduced to 1.33. Considering the case when 
b100 and cipher 10, the solutions are just 1.5 times less than the optimal. Hence, the 
result for the differential probability for different random networks also strengthens the 
argument for the viability of the TRI algorithm. That is, although TRI does not guarantee 
an optimal result, it effectively finds good, often optimal solutions. 
Table 4.6 strengthens our claim that not many active S-boxes are required in each 
round during linear and differential cryptanalysis of SPNs. From the table, 85% of the 
cases involved only one active S-box per round in finding the optimal 6 round differential 
characteristics of a cipher. The result also shows that 100% of the time the average 
number of S-boxes in each round is less than 2. 
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Cipher- IPMlMM TRI TRI TRI TRI (L=50) 
(ODtimal) (L=4000) I (L-lOOO) I (L-lOO) 
1 J.37e4 1.37e4 1.03e-4 1.03e4 1.030-4 
2 6.lOe-5 6.lOe-5 6.10e-5 7.620-6 3.810-6 
3 9.15e-5 9.15e-5 9.150-5 9.150-5 6.860-5 
4 J.54e4 J.54e4 1.54e-4 7.720-5 7.7iJ.e-5 
5 1.52e-5 J.52e-5 J.52e-5 l.52e-5 Q20-5 
6 .00278 .00278 .00278 .00278 .00278 
7 2.44e4 2.44e4 2.44e4 2.44e4 2.4404 
8 9.31e4 9.31e4 8.94e4 8.94e4 8.94e4 
9 5.4ge4 5.4ge4 5.4ge4 5.4ge4 1.83e4 
10 3.0ge4 2.05e4 1.54e4 l.37e4 J.37e4 
11 9.15e-5 9.15e-5 9.15e-5 9.J5e-5 6. JO.e-5 
12 6.lOe-5 6.10e-5 6.10e-5 6.10e-5 6.10e-5 
13 1.52e-5 J.52e-5 1.52e-5 1.52e-5 1.52e-5 
14 1.52e-5 J.52e-5 J.52e-5 J.52e-5 J.52e-5 
15 1.1604 1.1604 1.1604 1.1604 2.44<-5 
16 5.15e-5 5.l5e-5 3.860-5 2.2ge-5 2.2ge-5 
17 2.290-5 2.290-5 2.290-5 2.2ge-5 2.2ge-5 
18 9.15e-5 6.860-5 6.860-5 6.10e-5 6.10e-5 
19 .00278 .00278 .00278 .00278 .00278 
20 2.44e4 1.22e4 1.22e4 J.22e4 1.22e-4 
Table 4.5: Maximum Differential Probability of 6 Round for 20 Different Cipher-A 
Networks using Random S-boxes. 
The time variation for the optimal algorithm is dramatic in finding the 6 round 
differential characteristic of Cipher-A. The results are shown in Table 4.7. The time 
ranges from 20 seconds to 43 minutes for a small number of rounds in a cipher. However 
using TRI algorithm the variation in time is not that significant. For example, when 
L=4000, the average time for the cipher is approximately 8 minutes, and it ranges from 4 
minutes to 13 minutes. Similarly, when L is less than or equal to 100, the time variation is 
in magnitude of seconds. 
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Cipher IPMlMM TRI TRI TRI TRI (L=50) 
(Optimal) (L=4000) (L=l000) (L=l00) 
1 6 6 7 7 7 
2 6 6 6 7 7 
3 6 6 6 6 6 
4 6 6 6 8 8 
5 6 6 6 6 6 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
7 6 6 6 6 6 
8 9 9 8 8 8 , 
9 6 6 6 6 6 
10 6 6 7 6 6 
11 6 6 6 6 6 
12 6 6 6 6 6 
13 6 6 6 6 6 
14 6 6 6 6 6 
15 8 8 8 8 10 
16 8 8 8 6 6 
17 6 6 6 6 6 
18 6 7 7 6 6 
19 6 6 6 6 6 
20 6 6 6 6 6 
Table 4.6: Number of Active S-boxes Involved in 6 Round Differential Characteristics of 
20 Different Cipher-A Networks using Random S-boxes 
4.1.2 Results Using Good S-boxes in Cipher-A Network 
In this section, we will consider good S-boxes that are selected to satisfy some 
cryptographic properties, like the DES S-boxes. The DES S-boxes are 4x4 S-boxes and 
the mapping of the S-boxes is shown in the Appendix (Table A.2). The maximum value 
in the bias-table and in the difference-table is shown in Table 4.8. When the 6 round 
linear approximation is made using the optimal !PM algorithm and the TRl algorithm, 
there is a good amount of difference in the result obtained from the two algorithms in the 
cipher 1. However in other four ciphers the result achieved using the TRl algorithm is 
optimal or close to optimal as depicted in Table 4.9. 
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Cipher IPM(Optimal) TRI (L=4000) TRI (L=lOOO) TRI(L=lOO) TRI (L=SO) 
Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time{min:sec) Time(min:sec) 
4:30 4:14 1:53 0:30 0:26 
6:13 4:58 1:18 0:35 0:21 
8:36 4:28 1:04 0:21 0:10 
4:39 7:15 1:23 0:32 0:16 
38:32 7:41 1:11 0:36 0:30 
0:23 6:20 1:13 0:14 0:13 
1:50 5:42 1:15 0:18 0:10 
1:14 11:28 1:13 0:30 , 0:26 
0:50 7:01 1:03 0:25 0:27 
10 2:03 12:32 1:29 0:33 0:07 
II 7:36 9:00 1:16 0:27 0:17 
12 4:21 8:14 1:26 0:35 0:24 
13 31:27 10:40 1:40 0:25 0:25 
14 42:47 11:02 1:31 0:36 0:27 
15 5:19 7:11 1:01 0:16 0:12 
16 12:38 7:37 1:27 0:38 0:16 
17 30:19 11:26 1:24 0:33 0:22 
18 5:31 9:38 1:21 0:26 0:21 
19 0:21 5:24 0:49 0:13 0:12 
20 1:01 5:18 1:03 0:25 0:19 
Table 4.7: Execution Time Required in 6 Round Differential Characteristic of 20 
Different Cipher-A Networks using Random S-boxes 
Cipher using DES I 2 3 4 5 
S-boxes 
Max.bias 6 6 6 6 6 
(bias-table) 
Max. difference 8 6 8 8 8 
(difference-table) 
Table 4.8: Maximum Value in Bias-Iable and Difference-table using DES S-boxes in 
Cipher-A Network 
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The TRI results from the ciphers I, 3 and 5 give the impression that with the 
increase in the length L, the results obtained are better and somewhat close to optimal. 
Hence increasing the value of L appears to be a pracl;ipal way to get close to the optimal 
I 
result. 
Cipher IPMlMM TRI TRI TRJ TRI (L-50) 
(DES (Optimal) (L=4oo0) (L=I000) (L=IOO) 
S-boxes) 
I .00469 .00247 .00208 .001 IO .001 IO 
2 .00293 .00293 .00293 .00293 .00293 
3 .00235 .00195 .00124 .00110 .001 IO 
4 .01583 .01583 .01583 .01583 .01583 
5 .00989 .00989 .00989 .00742 .00626 
Table 4.9: Maximum Bias of 6 Round Linear Approximation for 5 Different Cipher-A 
Networks using DES S-boxes 
An interesting result can be viewed in Table 4.1 0, which shows the number of 
active S-boxes involved during the approximation of Cipher-A using DES S-boxes. The 
results for ciphers I and 3 shows that the number of active S-boxes involved in the 
approximation is more when the optimal result is found as compared to the TRI algorithm 
which involves fewer active S-boxes during the approximation. The execution time is 
shown in the Appendix (Table A.3). These results clearly suggest that average execution 
time per cipher for the optimal solution is factor of 3 more than the TRI algorithm for 
L=40oo. Hence TRI is definitely faster as compared to the optimal IPM algorithm. 
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Cipher IPM/MM TRI TRI TRI TRI (L=50) 
(DES (Optimal) (L=4000) (L=lOOO) (L=lOO) 
S-boxes) 
I 12 10 12 7 7 
2 8 8 8 8 8 
3 II 8 9 -- 9 9 
4 12 12 12 12 12 
5 8 8 8 9 II 
Table 4.10: Number of Active S-boxes Involved in 6 Round Linear Approximation of 5 
Different Cipher-A Networks using DES S-boxes 
The results for TRI algorithm are also encouraging during the differential 
cryptanalysis of Cipher-A using DES S-boxes. The TRI algorithm gives the optimal 
result for 40% of the cases even for low value of L as shown in the Table 4.11. The 
solutions which are not optimal are still close to optimal in all the cases. 
Cipher IPMlMM TRI TRI TRI TRI (L=50) 
(DES (Optimal) (L=4000) (L=lOOO) (L=lOO) 
S-boxes) 
1 1.54e-4 1.54e-4 1.54e-4 1.54e-4 1.54e-4 
2 2.44e-5 1.53.-5 1.53.-5 8.58.-6 3.22.-6 
3 1.53e-5 1.53.-5 1.53.-5 1.53.-5 1.53e-5 
4 2.28e-5 l.72e-5 l.72e-5 l.72e-5 1.14e-5 
5 1.73.-4 1.460-4 1.46e-4 1.30e-4 1.30e-4 
Table 4.11: Maximum Differential Probability for 6 Round Differential Characteristic of 
5 Different Cipher-A Networks using DES S-boxes. 
From the Table 4.12, we can deduce that the average execution time for the !PM 
algorithm is approximately 75 minutes as compared to TRI algorithm for L=4000 which 
gives a good result in approximately 8 minutes. Hence TRI is much faster as compared to 
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the !PM algorithm and is scalable to more number of rounds in Cipher-A as well as being 
applicable to 64-bit networks like Cipher-B and Cipher-C. 
Cipher IPM(Optimal) TRI (L=4000) TRI (L=1000) TRI (L=100) • TRI (L=50) 
using Time{min:sec) Time{min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) 
DESS· I 
box , 
1 80:10 8:27 1:30 0:34 0:17 
2 73:23 7:53 1:56 0:27 0:13 
3 114:11 8:32 1:25 0:37 0:29 
4 91:43 9:18 1:37 0:33 0:40 
5 17:14 6:01 1:28 0:36 0:19 
Table 4.12: Execution Time Required in 6 Round Differential Characteristic of 5 
Different Cipher-A Network using DES S-boxes 
As discussed earlier in the section, the !PM and MM algorithms fail to give result 
in practical time when the number of rounds is greater than 8 for the Cipher-A network. 
However, the TRI algorithm can be used for a large number of rounds for the Cipher-A 
network. Results for a sample 15 round linear approximation are shown in Table 4.13. 
Since the optimal result of the network is not available, the results are compared with the 
loose upper bounds. The loose upper bound is calculated by using the maximum value 
from the bias-table and assuming that only one S-box will be involved during the 
approximation. This upper bound is very loose and in most cases even the optimal result 
will deviate from it because the optimal result will not always consist of one S-box and 
the maximum value in the table. This can be seen in the results in Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.9 and 
4.10. The results from the TRI algorithm give an insight look into the difficulty of the 
attack and also show the change in the linear approximation with the change in the value 
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of L. From the Table 4.13, we can see that the cipher 9 is a very weak cipher as its bias 
value is equal to the upper bound and is an order of magnitude 3 higher than that of other 
bias values found in the table. 
Cipher Upper Bound TRI TRI TRI ,TRI 
(15 rounds) (L=4000) (L=lOOO) (L=lOO) (L=50) 
1 .00668 1.833e-5 1.031e-5 1.031e-5 11.031e-5 
2 .00668 \.788e-7 1.341e-7 1.341e-7 l.oo5e-7 
3 .00668 1.60ge-6 1.430e-6 1.430e-6 1.430e-6 
4 .00668 2.74ge-5 2.74ge-5 2.74ge-5 2.74ge-5 
5 .00668 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 
6 .00668 1.5260.7 1.526e-7 1.526e-7 1.526e-7 
7 .00668 1.430e-6 1.073e-6 7.152e-7 2.384e-7 
8 .00668 1.738e-4 1. 158e-4 1. 158e-4 1.158e-4 
9 .00668 .00668 .00668 .00668 .00668 
10 .00668 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 
11 .00668 3.6660.5 3.666e-5 3.258e-5 3.258e-5 
12 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 7.62ge-7 
13 1.526e-5 1.907e-6 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 
14 .00668 3.576e-7 3.576e-7 1. 192e-7 7.54e-8 
15 .00668 3.576e-7 2.682e-7 2.682e-7 2.263e-7 
16 .00668 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 
17 .00668 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 7.62ge-6 3.814e-6 
18 .00668 1.526e-5 3.814e-6 3.814e-6 3.814e-6 
19 .00668 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 9.536e-7 
20 .00668 1.526e-5 1.526e-5 1.907e-6 3.576e-7 
Table 4.13: Maximum bias of 15 Round Approximation for 20 Different Cipher-A 
Networks using Random S-boxes 
Similarly, cipher 12 has a bias value that is equal to the upper bound, although the 
bias is not as poor as cipher 9. We can also see that cipher 5 and cipher 19 are good 
ciphers because they have low bias values among the 20 ciphers given in the table for 
L=4000. In approximately 90% of the cases, we can see that even for large value of L the 
result is not close to the upper bound and we can conjecture that the upper bound is 
significantly greater than the actual largest bias. We conjecture that a good way of 
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checking the perfoonance of the TRI algorithm is to run the algorithm for different values 
of L. If for large L the result remains the same, then we can assume that the solution 
might be close to optimal, if not optimal. However, lpere is no way to prove whether the 
) 
solution is optimal or not. 
, 
The execution times and the numbers of active S-boxes invplved during the 
approximation are shown in Table 4.14 and in Table 4.15 respectively. The general trend 
in the execution time clearly suggests that increasing the value of L will increase the 
execution time but will also increase the probability of finding a good bias for the 
approximation. Table 4.15 indicates that average number of S-boxes required per round is 
less than or equal to 2. For L=4000, it also shows that for 55% of the cases the TRI finds 
a good solution by involving only one S-box per round. 
TRI (L=4000) TRI (L=lOOO) TRI (L=lOO) TRI (L=SO) 
Cioher Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) 
1 14:24 3:14 0:58 0:33 
30:22 6:57 1:24 1:06 
29:01 4:33 1:01 0:49 
34:30 4:08 1:06 0:57 
30:48 4:16 1:06 0:49 
4:28 2:25 0:37 0:34 
22:56 4:38 1:12 0:41 
5:25 1:49 0:33 0:20 
4:47 1:08 0:13 0:07 
10 8:5 1 2:44 0:43 0:17 
11 24:51 3:40 0:25 0:17 
12 5:58 1:36 0:43 0:44 
13 23: 14 4:50 0:58 0:34 
14 50:30 8:10 1:46 0:44 
15 26: 15 3:33 1:02 0:37 
16 12:27 2:57 0:23 0:15 
17 8:08 1:56 0:51 1:04 
18 9:06 3:30 0:58 0:48 
19 20:25 8:35 1:07 0:50 
20 19:20 1:41 0:53 0:39 
Table 4.14: ExecutIOn Time ReqUired In 15 Round LInear ApproXimatIon for 20 
Different Cipher-A Networks using Random S-boxes 
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Cipher TRI TRI TRI TRI 
I (L=4000) (L=lOOO) (L=lOO) (L=50) 
I 20 21 21 21 
2 16 20 20 21 
3 17 15 15 15 
4 20 20 20 .. 20 
5 19 19 19 19 I 
6 15 15 15 15 , 
7 17 17 17 19 
8 15 15 15 15 
9 15 15 15 15 
10 15 15 15 15 
II 17 17 16 16 
12 15 15 15 15 
13 15 15 15 15 
14 15 15 17 25 
15 17 16 16 18 
16 15 15 15 15 
17 15 15 15 16 
18 15 17 17 17 
19 19 19 19 19 
20 15 15 16 18 
Table 4.15: Number of Active S-boxes Involved in 15 Round Linear Approximation for 
20 Different Cipher-A Networks using Random S-boxes 
For the 16-bit SPN network or Cipher-A, we can find that the TRl algorithm gives 
good results and in many of the cases, the result is optimal (i.e., the largest 
bias/differential probability is found) when L=4000. The length 4000 was arbitrarily 
chosen to ensure that sufficient number of results is available after every two rounds to 
make a good decision for the next two rounds. However this length can be increased or 
decreased depending how well the solution is achieved for low values of L. With smaller 
values of L, the algorithm will run faster; with larger values of L, the algorithm is more 
likely to find the optimal, i.e. largest, bias or differential probability. We also found that 
the TRl algorithm is much faster in giving the result as compared to !PM or MM because 
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of its linear complexity in tenns of the number of rounds. Due to its efficiency, the TRI 
algorithm can be scalable to larger networks like the 64-bit Cipher-B and Cipher-C. In 
the next section, we will apply the TRI algorithm to Cipher-B and study the properties of 
.. 
the network by changing the S-boxes. 
4.2 Results for Cipher-B 
In this section we will look into the results obtained by running the TRI algorithm 
on Cipher-B networks to examine linear and differential cryptana1ysis. However, first we 
will study the bias-table and the difference-table of an 8x8 S-box. From the bias-table 
and difference-table we will analyze the spread of the maximum value in the table. In 
general, 8x8 S-box will have 256x256 entries in the table. The maximum value in the 
bias-table can range from 2 to 126 and from 2 to 254 for the difference-table (excluding 
the (0,0) entry which will always be 128 for the bias-table and 256 for the difference-
table). The higher the values in the table, the more effective the linear and differential 
cryptanalysis can be. Hence, a cipher designer wishes these values to be generally as low 
as possible. 
The maximum bias value and difference value for 10000 randomly selected 8x8 
S-boxes were used to plot a histogram corresponding to the maximum value in the bias-
table versus the frequency of occurrence (count). This is shown in Figure 4.1. From the 
histogram, it can be seen that approximately 94% of the bias values are concentrated 
around 32 to 38. The most likely maximum value is found to be for 34 which constitutes 
about 39% of the total and is closely followed by value 36 which comprise approximately 
32% of the total. Similarly, the histogram plotted in Figure 4.2 represents the maximum 
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value in the difference-table versus the frequency of occurrence (count). The plot shows 
that approximately 94% of the maximum difference probability values are shared 
between 10 and 12. 
I 
Based on the results from Section 4.1, we conjecture that typical,number of active 
S-boxes in each round of the best linear approximation of a cipher is 1 dr ,2. Hence, while 
running the TRI algorithm for a number of different Cipher-B networks, we make the 
assumption that not more than 3 S-boxes are involved in each round in the best linear 
approximation and differential characteristic of a cipher. This constraint is necessary to 
make the TRI algorithm run in a practical amount of time on large networks. Later on, in 
the section, we will see in most cases only one S-box is involved in the good solution 
found by the TRI algorithm. 
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Figure 4.1: Histogram Showing Maximum Value in Bias-table Versus Count 
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Figure 4.2: Histogram Showing Maximum Value in Difference-table Versus Count 
We have also looked into the maximum value from the bias-table and difference-
table when only one S-box is involved during the approximation, i.e. , when the Hamming 
weights of the input/output mask/difference is one. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 represent 
the maximum values when the Hamming weight is equal to one from the bias-table and 
difference-table, respectively. The plots in Figure 4.3 signifies that for Hamming weight 
equal to one, 65% of the masking values are concentrated around 18 to 22. Similarly, 
from the plot in Figure 4.4, it can be viewed that approximately 89% of the difference 
values are shared between 4 and 6. The plot for the maximum value for Hamming weight 
equal to two and three from the bias-table and difference-table are shown in the Appendix 
(Figures A.I to A.4). 
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Figure 4.4: Histogram Showing Maximum Value in Difference-table Versus Count When 
Hamming Weight =1. 
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The TRI algorithm was run for IO ciphers based on random S-boxes number R-I 
to R-IO as shown in Table 4.16. This table also includes the results for mathematically 
structured S-boxes like AES and Camellia S-boxes n~.mbered CAM-I to CAM-4 and also 
1 
good S-boxes that have low maximum values in bias-table and <4fference-table for 
Hamming weight equal to one. The 4 good S-boxes are numbered frdn;' GR-I to GR-4. 
From the table we can see that for the IO random S-boxes the maximum bias value in the 
table is in thirties for 90% of the time as expected from Figure 4.1. Similarly, for 100% of 
the time, the maximum value in the difference-table is between IO and 12, similar to what 
is expected from Figure 4.2. We can see that for mathematically structured S-boxes like 
AES and Camellia, the maximum values in the bias-table and difference-table are much 
less, and this is to be expected since these S-boxes were constructed to have good linear 
and differential properties. The good S-boxes have a value comparable to AES and 
Camellia for Hamming weight equal to one; however they differ significantly for overall 
maximum value in bias-table and difference-table. This is because AES and Camellia 
have good values spread out consistently in the tables, while the good S-box is a 
randomly selected S-box to have low values for only Hamming weight equal to one. 
A seven round approximation is determined using the TRI algorithm and the 
resulting biases and differential probabilities are shown in Table 4.17. The TRI algorithm 
was run for fixed L=8000 for all the ciphers. From this table we can see that the good S-
boxes give the best results in terms of bias and even outperform the AES and Camellia S-
box based networks. However, the difference is very small. Similarly, we can also see 
that in 50% of the cases a random S-box based network gives a comparable result to the 
good S-boxes and the mathematically structured S-boxes based network. 
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In the case of differential cryptanalysis, AES gives the best differential 
probability. Nevertheless, the results of the random S-boxes and the good S-boxes are 
also comparable for Cipher-B. We can also see tha.! for mathematically structured S-
I 
boxes the solution is very close to the loose upper bound. This is because the maximum 
values for the AES and Camellia S-boxes are evenly spread out in the'~ias-table and the 
difference-table. However for the other S-boxes, the upper bound is several factors higher 
than the linear and differential solutions. This is because the maximum value in the tables 
is not actually used during the approximation in many cases. 
Cipher Max. value in Max. value Max. value Max. Max. Max. 
bias-table (hamming (hamming difference ditTerence ditTerence 
wI =1,2 or 3) wl=l) in (hamming (hamming 
difference- wt==l,2 or wl=l) 
table 3) 
R-l 38 32 22 12 IO 6 
R-2 38 30 22 12 IO 4 
R-3 34 30 20 IO IO 6 
R-4 36 28 26 IO IO 4 
R-5 34 32 22 12 12 6 
R-6 32 32 18 IO IO 4 
R-7 42 32 22 12 12 6 
R-8 38 36 18 IO 8 6 
R-9 36 34 20 12 12 4 
R-I0 34 32 22 12 IO 6 
AES 16 16 16 4 4 2 
CAM-l 16 16 14 4 4 4 
CAM-2 16 16 14 4 4 4 
CAM-3 16 16 14 4 4 4 
CAM-4 16 16 14 4 4 4 
GR-l 32 30 14 IO IO 4 
GR-2 32 32 12 IO 8 4 
GR-3 34 32 12 12 IO 4 
GR-4 36 34 14 14 14 2 
Table 4.16: Maximum Value in Bias-table and Difference-table of Different Hamming 
Weight for Random and Good S-boxes for Cipher-B 
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Cipher Max. bias (7 Theoretical Upper Bound Max. differential Theoretical Upper 
round) bias (7 round) probability(7 round) Bound differential 
probability(7 round) 
R-t 1.337e-6 1.0160-4 6.821e-13 1.387e-1O 
R-2 4.754e-7 1.0160-4 6.821e-13 1.387e-1O 
R-3 3.8300-7 4.665e-5 1.151e-12 1.387e-1O 
R-4 l.344e-6 6.9600-5 · ~.094o-13 1.387e-1O 
R-5 3.781e-7 4.665e-5 1.5340-12 4.972e-1O 
R-6 4.5160-7 3.052e-5 6.821e-13 1.387e-1O 
R-7 9.104e-7 2.047e-4 9.0940-13 4.972e-10 
R-8 1.432e-6 1.0 16e-4 9.592e-13 , 2.9100-11 
R-9 1.2300-6 6.96Oe-5 8.5260-14 4.972e-1O 
R-!O 1.208e-6 4.665e-5 3.453e-12 1.387e-10 
AES 1.788e-7 2.384e-7 7.105e-15 2.273e-13 
CAM-! 1.223e-7 2.3840-7 5.6840-14 2.273e-13 
CAM-2 1.223e-7 2.384e-7 2.842e-14 2.273e-13 
CAM-3 1.223e-7 2.3840-7 5.6840-14 2.273e-13 
CAM-4 1.223e-7 2.384e-7 2.842e-14 2.273e-13 
GR-! 2.737e-7 3.052e-5 9.0940-13 2.9100-11 
GR-2 4.638e-8 3.052e-5 6.812e-13 2.9100-11 
GR-3 1.34ge-8 4.665e-5 5.1160-13 4.972e-1O 
GR-4 1.7200-7 6.96Oe-5 2.6640- 14 1.462e-9 
Table 4.17: Maximum Bias and Differential Probability for 7 Round Approximation 
using TRI for fixed L=8000 on a Cipher-B Network. 
Further results for linear approximation are shown in Table 4.18 based on the 
TRI algorithm by varying L for 20 random S-boxes. The linear approximation is of 7 
rounds. From the table we can interpret that by increasing the value of L, the bias value 
also increased and is somewhat close to the upper bound in many cases. The results also 
indicate that in many cases only one S-box is involved during the approximation. 
Although we cannot know for sure, we conjecture that the results for larger L are close to 
the optimal result. An important conclusion can also be drawn that there is little 
difference in bias value of a random selected S-boxes and the mathematically structured 
S-boxes like AES and Camellia. From Table 4.17, we can see that the bias value of the 
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randomly selected S-boxes have almost the same order of magnitude as AES and 
Camellia. 
Cipher Upper Bound TRI TRI TRI 
(7 rounds) I (L=1000l (L=l00l (L=50l. 
6.96e-S 1.3940-6 8.580e-7 8.044e-7 
6.96e-5 1.655e-6 1.655e-6 1.655e-6 
I.Ole-4 6.930e-7 5.720e-7 3.782e-7 
4.66e-5 8.380e-7 3.86Oe-7 2.200e-7 
3.05e-5 7.03ge-7 7.03ge-7 2.693e-7 
3.05e-5 3.0940-6 3.094e-6 3.0940-6 
4.66e-5 4.585e-7 2.292e-7 2.062e-7 
6.96e-5 7.603e-7 7.603e-7 5.865e-7 
6.96e-5 9.547e-7 9.547e-7 9.547e-7 
10 6.96e-5 2.81ge-6 1.24Se-6 1.245e-6 
/I 3.05e-S 1.773e-6 1.300e-6 1.300e-6 
12 4.66e-5 1.121e-6 I.035e-6 9.613e-7 
13 4.66e-5 1.047e-6 8.145e-7 8.145e-7 
14 4.66e-5 4.061e-7 7.45ge-8 1.131e-8 
15 4.66e-5 1.6 1 6e-6 6.384e-7 6. 1 88e-7 
16 3.05e-5 4.073e-6 2.036e-6 2.036e-6 
17 6.96e-5 6.630e-7 I.S1ge-7 1.5 I ge-7 
18 4.66<-5 6.223e-7 4.243e-7 3.88ge-7 
19 4.66e-5 2.071e-6 1. 1 64e-6 9.41Se-7 
20 3.05e-5 l.S91e-6 1.S9Je-6 1.591e-6 
Table 4.18: Maximum Bias of 7 Round Approximations for Cipher-B Network 
It is interesting to note the execution time for different values of L. Table 4.19, 
indicates that there is not much difference in the execution time for L=lOOO and L=50. If 
we compare the results with the results obtained for Cipher-A networks using the TRl 
algorithm. there was significant amount of time difference for the different L values. The 
reason is that in Cipher-B networks most of the time is spent in deriving the list value 
after the initial two rounds. The algorithm has to look into almost 42 million inputs in 
round one and select the best two round inputs of length L after the first two rounds. For 
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the rest of the two round steps the algorithm will take much less time because it considers 
only L input values to find the next L input values for the next two rounds. Hence, by 
increasing the number of rounds in the cipher for, any given L, the change in the 
execution time will not be of significant factor. Similarly by varyiJg L, for a fixed 
number of rounds in the cipher, the change in the execution time is not'that prominent as 
shown in Table 4.19. For example for L=SO, the average execution time is approximately 
28 minutes while for L= I 000, the average execution time is approximately 40 minutes. 
Similar results were achieved for differential cryptanalysis. The results are shown in 
Appendix (Table A.4 and A.S). 
Cipher TRI (L-IOOO) TRI (L-lOO) TRl (L=50) 
Tim.(min:sec) Tim.(min:sec) Tim.(min:sec) 
I 44:01 31:44 30:27 
2 40:29 27:41 26:51 
3 45:47 28:30 31:15 
4 40:08 28:30 25:43 
5 38:46 28:07 25:25 
6 38:24 27:28 27:33 
7 43:46 26:37 25:53 
8 39:08 27:55 26:44 
9 44:44 35:00 29:04 
10 44:22 29:20 27:32 
II 46:08 27:17 26:00 
12 43:53 27:10 26:20 
13 43:46 29:56 26:00 
14 52:35 29:49 27:08 
15 42:36 27:43 26:17 
16 39:11 28:18 26:56 
17 44:53 30:00 27:11 
18 44:53 27:32 26:43 
19 39:53 27:59 27:58 
20 44:32 27:20 27:04 
Table 4.19: Execution Time in 7 Round Linear Approximation for 20 Different Cipher-B 
Networks using Random S-boxes 
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4.3 Results for Cipher·C 
" 
, 
In Section 4.2. we discussed the results obtained for a 64-bit SPN structure using 
8x8 S-boxes. In this section we will again look into llJe results obtained for a 64-bit SPN 
I 
structure but using 4x4 S-boxes. The results in this section show the applicability of our 
algorithm on different SPN structures. The random S-boxes used in Se'c~on 4.1 are used 
in this section too. We have assumed that the maximum 3 active S-boxes are involved in 
each round to find the maximum bias or differential probability. 
Cipher Upper Bound TRI TRI TRI 
(7 rounds) (L=lOOO) (L=lOO) (L=50) 
I .06674 .00330 .00330 .00330 
2 .06674 3.662e-4 3.662e-4 1.144e-5 
3 .06674 .00585 .00585 .00585 
4 .06674 .00164 .00164 5.493e-4 
5 .06674 9.765e-4 9.765e-4 1.220e-4 
6 .06674 .00390 .00390 .00390 
7 .06674 .00146 7.324e-4 7.3240-4 
8 .06674 .0l3l8 .01318 .01318 
9 .06674 .06674 .0222 .01407 
10 .06674 .00390 .00390 .00198 
II .06674 .0222 .0197 .01318 
12 .00390 .00195 .00195 4.882e-4 
13 .00390 .00390 4.882e-4 4.882e-4 
14 .06674 .00123 .00123 .00123 
15 .06674 .00219 .00219 9.26ge-4 
16 .06674 .00146 .00146 .00146 
17 .06674 .00390 9.765e-4 9.765e-4 
18 .06674 .00390 9.765e-4 2.44le-4 
19 .06674 4.882e-4 2.44le-4 2.44le-4 
20 .06674 .00390 .00390 .00390 
Table 4.20: Maximum Bias of 7 Round Linear Approximation for Cipher-C using 
Random S-boxes 
Table 4.20 illustrates the bias detennined by applying the TRI algorithm to 20 
different Cipher-C networks using random S-boxes. From the Table 4.20. we can see that 
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in 65% of the cases the result obtained for L=1000 and L=IOO are the same. The result 
shown in column two of the table refers to the weak upper bound that involves just one S-
box per round and the maximum bias of the S-box. For cipher 9 we can see that for 
.. 
L= I 000, the result is equal to the upper bound which is the exceptional}ase and indicates 
that the cipher is weak. The results in Table 4.21 suggest that by incre~sing the length of 
the buffers to store the good solutions the execution time also increases and in some cases 
by a good margin. If we consider cipher 8 in Table 4.21, we can see that execution time 
for L=IOOO is 45 minutes, while the execution time for L=50 is 3 minutes to get the same 
result. 
Cipher TRI (L=1000) 
Time(min:se~) 
TRI (L=l00) 
Tim.lmin:sec) 
TRI (L=50) 
Tim.lmin:sec) 
110:48 83:36 72:37 
20:23 19:34 20:02 
16:13 15:32 13:33 
18:04 17:34 16:46 
95:18 78:24 63:29 
55:06 50:23 39:06 
44:17 16:33 16:39 
45:29 5:00 3:06 
20:55 3:20 2:25 
10 90:17 30:06 39:05 
11 33:48 2:31 2:08 
12 25:29 20:17 5:39 
13 70:39 43:04 35:22 
14 52:52 31:12 18:56 
15 74:32 38:48 37:49 
16 315:19 11:48 5:09 
17 64:59 36:38 36:36 
18 70:46 45:28 43:21 
19 78:21 57:42 50:36 
20 62:20 37:11 38:48 
Table 4.21: Execution Time in 7 Round Linear Approximation for Cipher-C Networks 
using Random S-boxes 
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Similarly for differential cryptanalysis, if we analyze Table 4.22, we can see that 
the results are the same 70% of the cases for L=1000 and L=IOO. We can also see that for 
cipher 6 the result is equal to the upper bound. This :esult also suggests that there might 
- I 
be some ciphers for which the optimal result will be equal to the uppe~ bound. However, 
if we consider Table 4.23, we can see sharp difference in the executio~ lime for L=1000 
and L=IOO. For example, cipher 13 takes almost 5 hours to get the result with L=1000, 
but just 45 minutes with L=IOO and 26 minutes with L=50 to get the same result. 
Similarly, we can view that for cipher 16 TRI algorithm for L=1000 has execution time 5 
times more as compared to L=IOO to get the same result. 
Cipher Upper Bound TRI TRI TRI 
(7 rounds) (L=1000) (L=100) (L=SO) 
I .00104 6.437e-6 1.072e-6 5.364e-7 
2 6.103e-5 3.814e-6 1.907e-6 9.536e-7 
3 .00104 1.716e-5 1.716e-5 1.287e-5 
4 .00104 3.862e-5 3.862e-5 1.716e-5 
5 .00104 1.907e-6 1.907e-6 1.907e-6 
6 .00104 .00104 .00104 .00104 
7 .00781 6.103e-5 6.103e-5 6.103e-5 
8 .03725 2.384e-5 2.384e-5 2.384e-5 
9 .00104 4.577e-5 4.577e-5 4.577e-5 
10 .00104 5.14ge-5 5.14ge-5 2.574e-5 
II .00104 1.525e-5 7.62ge-6 3.814<-6 
12 6.103e-5 1.525e-5 7.62ge-6 3.814<-6 
13 .00104 1.907e-6 1.907e-6 1.907e-6 
14 .00104 1.907e-6 1.907e-6 1.907e-6 
15 .00104 2.575e-5 3.620e-6 3.620e-6 
16 .00104 2.86Ie-6 2.86Ie-6 1.430e-6 
17 .00104 2.86Ie-6 2.86Ie-6 2.86Ie-6 
18 .00104 1.525e-5 I. I 44e-5 5.722e-6 
19 .00104 .00104 .00104 .00104 
20 .00781 6.103e-5 6.103e-5 6.103e-5 
Table 4.22: Maximum Differential Probability of 7 Round Approximation for Cipher-C 
using Random S-boxes 
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Cipher TRI (L-lOOO) 
Timelmin:se~) 
TRI (L-lOO) 
Timelmin:sec) 
TRI (L-50) 
Timelmin:see) 
79:15 48:42 30:06 
175:13 54:51 14:18 
93:48 24:06 8:17 f 
156:53 13:53 9:34 . 
243:05 65:42 60:35 
50:09 6:13 3:33 
66:40 8:43 13:15 
75:28 38:27 29:25 
155:17 121:13 122:05 
10 138:41 9:13 4:39 
II 54:00 25:32 19:07 
12 147:06 14:40 13:39 
13 315:00 41:06 26:44 
14 231:10 62:54 58:11 
15 62:04 54:09 13:51 
16 108:35 21:42 11:37 
17 155:12 26:12 25:05 
18 77:16 48:04 43:28 
19 28:53 9:34 7:43 
20 59:06 27:14 25:43 
Table 4.23: Execution Time in 7 Round Differential Characteristic for Cipher-C 
Networks using Random S-boxes 
Another interesting aspect is to note that the execution time for the Cipher-C 
network varies dramatically with the increase in the value of L but the execution time for 
Cipher-B network doesn't vary much with the increase in the value of L. The reason is 
that Cipher-B makes use of the 8x8 S-boxes and it has large bias and differential 
probability variation due to the values present in the bias-table and the difference-table. 
For example, the values in the bias-table can vary from 0 to 40 as seen in Figure 4.1. 
Contrary to that, the values in the bias-table for the 4x4 S-box will only vary from 0 to 
6. Hence, the greedy approach does not help much in focusing on best approximation / 
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characteristic. Due to this reason TRI shows different behavior for Cipher-B and Cipher-
C when it is executed. In the case of Cipher-B. TRI spends the maximum time in order to 
find the best approximation for the first two rou~ds; hence the execution time for 
J 
different L does not vary sharply. On the other hand for Cipher-C. \RI approximately 
even time to execute for every two rounds and for increasing L value th~ execution time 
varies dramatically. This is because the number of combinations involved to make 
approximation in first two rounds in Cipher-C is much less compared to Cipher-B. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter we showed the performance of our TRI algorithm for various 
cipher networks. The cipher networks were changed with the S-boxes for the fixed cipher 
structures of Cipher-A. Cipher-B and Cipher-Co All the cipher structures we studied are 
practically realizable ciphers and had good cryptographic properties. We have shown 
with tables and figures that our TRI algorithm is often successful in finding the optimal 
solution in practical time for realistically-sized networks. 
The TRI algorithm can be used to analyze SPN structures resistance with respect 
to linear and differential cryptanalysis. With respect to Cipher-A. the TRI algorithm finds 
the optimal result (i.e. best linear approximation and differential probability) with high 
likelihood or finds a good non-optimal result. The results from Cipher-A suggest that 
optimal results tend to involve small number of S-boxes per round. With respect to the 
64-bit network. it can be seen that the random S-boxes can provide good properties with 
low bias and differential probability. From the results it can be concluded TRI is a 
practical tool to give results on 64-bit realistically sized networks (using either 8x8 or 
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4x4 S-boxes). The results also suggest that S-boxes can be selected to give results as 
good as the AES and Camellia S-boxes. Lastly, it can be concluded that TRI is much 
more efficient than other algorithms (IPMIMM) th~t are guaranteed to give optimal 
I 
results. This leads to the next chapter where we will summarize Olll work and draw 
conclusions relevant to our work and suggest future directions for the re~~arch. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, we will summarize our thesis. We will draw cpnclusions of our 
work and also discuss the limitations related to our work. The limitations of our work can 
be further used as a basis for future research work. 
In Chapter 2, we discussed a basic SPN architecture. We have analyzed SPNs 
because they are still widely used in today' s modern cipher design in ciphers such as 
DES and AES. We studied three types of SPNs: a 16-bit SPN, based on 4-bit S-boxes 
(Cipher-A), and two 64-bit SPNs, one based on 8-bit S-boxes (Cipher-B) and one based 
on 4-bit S-boxes (Cipher-C). We discussed in detail about the applicability of the two 
most fundamental attacks on block ciphers, referred to as linear cryptanalysis and 
differential cryptanalysis. This chapter also provided an overview of the linear attack and 
the differential attack using the Cipher-A network. (A sample Cipher-A network was 
used to show the linear approximation and differential characteristic of the cipher.) A 
good linear attack tries to find the largest bias in the network, while a good differential 
attack tries to find the maximum differential probability in order to deduce the minimum 
number of plaintext I ciphertext pairs required to mount the attacks successfully. 
In Chapter 3, a number of algorithms have been studied and developed by us 
related to linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis. The algorithms find the best 
bias or differential probability for a block cipher and a corresponding linear 
approximation or differential characteristic. 
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Original algorithms developed related to the SPN structure were introduced in this 
chapter. Two optimal algorithms (!PM and MM), guaranteed to find the largest 
bias/differential probability, were developed along ,,:~th the non-optimal TRI algorithm 
that tries to find the optimal or close to optimal result. Some prelimiJary investigation 
showed that !PM and MM algorithm have there own limitations when a1>flied to the SPN 
architecture. The complexity of both the algorithms increases considerably with the 
increase of the number of rounds and the number of active S-boxes in each round. Hence, 
both the !PM and MM algorithm were only successful for 16-bit SPN and cannot be 
applied to the larger sized networks (like a 64-bit SPN). 
In order to overcome the limitations of the optimal algorithms, the heuristic TRI 
algorithm was developed. The TRI algorithm tries to find the optimal or close to optimal 
results. A significant achievement of the TRI algorithm is that the complexity of 
algorithm increases linearly with the increase in the number of rounds. Thus, we can 
analyze practically sized ciphers that include a large number of rounds. The search is 
reduced drastically because the tree search is perfonmed only on a maximumof two 
rounds; hence the number of nodes contributing in the tree structure is reduced. The TRI 
algorithm is shown to be scalable to large networks like Cipher-B and Cipher-Co Hence, 
the TRI algorithm is a useful tool to look into properties of S-boxes and cipher structures 
that are necessary for good cryptographic resistance to linear and differential 
cryptanalysis. 
In Chapter 4, a discussion was involved by analyzing the results for Cipher-A, 
Cipher-B and Cipher-C by running the !PM, MM and TRI algorithms. The perfonmance 
of the TRI algorithm was also evaluated by running it on various cipher networks. The 
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cipher networks were changed by modifying the S-boxes for the fixed cipher structures of 
Cipher-A, Cipher-B and Cipher-C. All the cipher structures we studied are practically 
realizable ciphers and had good cryptographic properties. We have shown with tables and 
figures that our TRl algorithm is often successful in finding the optimal solution in 
practical time on realistically sized networks. 
TRl can be used to analyze SPN structures resistance with respect to linear and 
differential cryptanalysis. With respect to the 16-bit network, the TRl algorithm finds the 
optimal result (i.e. best linear approximation and differential probability) with high 
likelihood or finds a good non-optimal result. The results from Cipher-A suggest that 
optimal results tend to involve small number of S-boxes per round. With respect to the 
64-bit network, it can be seen that the random S-boxes can provide good properties with 
low bias and differential probability. From the results it can be concluded that TRl is a 
practical tool to give results on realistically sized 64-bit networks (using either 8x8 or 
4x4 S-boxes). The results also suggest that S-boxes can be selected to give results as 
good as the AES and Camellia S-boxes. Lastly, it can be concluded that TR1 is much 
more efficient than other algorithms (IPMIMM) that are guaranteed to give the optimal 
result. 
During the implementation of the TRI algorithm on realistical ly sized ciphers 
(e.g. 64-bit), we have assumed that not more than 3 active S-boxes are involved in each 
round in order to find the best linear approximation and differential characteristic of the 
cipher. This assumption is made in order to reduce the search operations in the tree 
structure and to get the result in practical time. Even though this assumption is valid for 
most of the cipher cases, it cannot be generalized. Hence. one of the future works is to 
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implement an algorithm that considers all the possible combination of S-boxes in each 
round and still gives result in practical time. In our work we just considered two basic 
realistically-sized ciphers (Cipher-B and Cipher-C) l\I1d tested the effectiveness of the 
I 
TRI algorithm on them. Another future research can be testing the efltctiveness of TRI 
I 
algorithm on different kinds of practically realizable networks (e.g. 128-bit SPN or other 
64-bit ciphers). Also, an important future research can be the application of TRI to AES 
and other actually proposed ciphers. 
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APPENDIX 
Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
8-1 E B 1 6 3 5 A F 2 _8 0 7 4 D C 9 
8-2 4 B 0 E 7 D F 3 8 1 C 6 5 / A 2 9 
8-3 7 B 8 1 B 9 3 C A 5 6 2 R E 0 4 
8-4 1 B E C 3 A 4 0 7 D 2 9 6 8 5 F 
8-5 D B 2 1 9 7 F 0 6 C 4 5 Y E A 8 
8-6 F B 5 9 3 C 1 A 8 E 2 0 7 ' D 6 4 
8-7 4 B A 5 7 E 9 F 1 0 D C 6 3 8 2 
8-8 D B F 9 3 2 C 7 8 A 6 E 4 1 5 0 
8-9 8 B 4 C D 9 F E 2 6 5 0 1 7 A 3 
8-10 4 B 7 0 6 A 3 5 D E 1 2 F C 9 8 
8-11 A B 6 3 0 E 4 8 7 F 5 2 9 C D 1 
8-12 E B 4 3 7 F 9 0 6 5 2 D A 8 C 1 
8-13 1 B 5 7 C 2 6 D 0 F E 9 3 A 4 8 
8-14 0 B 8 E 9 5 4 1 2 7 D A 3 C F 6 
8-15 4 B C 1 6 E 0 2 A 7 9 8 5 D 3 F 
8-16 3 B 8 C A 7 E 9 D 2 0 5 1 4 F 6 
8-17 F B C 9 1 6 D 0 3 A 8 7 4 E 2 5 
8-18 B 0 F 3 2 5 7 E C A 9 1 4 6 8 D 
8-19 A B 4 5 F E 8 3 1 6 0 C D 9 2 7 
8-20 D B 9 3 F C 2 A 4 7 8 1 5 0 6 E 
Table A.I: S-box Representation (in hexadecimal) of 20 Random 4x4 S-boxes 
Input 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
8-1 E 4 D 1 2 F B 6 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7 
8-2 F 1 8 E 6 B 3 4 9 7 2 D C 0 5 A 
8-3 3 D 4 7 F 2 8 E C 0 1 A 6 9 B 5 
8-4 A 0 9 E 6 5 F 5 1 D C 7 B 4 2 8 
8-S 2 C 4 1 7 A B 6 8 5 3 F D 0 E 9 
Table A.2: S-box Representation (in hexadecimal) of 5 DES S-boxes 
Cipher IPM(Optimal) TRI (L=4oo0) TRI (L=looO) TRI (L=loo) TRI(L=50) 
(DES) Time(min:sec) Time(min:se~) Time{min:se~) Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) 
1 23:00 7:00 2:00 0:30 0:20 
2 52:00 7:00 1:30 0:25 0:20 
3 67:00 9:00 2:00 1:00 0:40 
4 8:00 14:00 2:00 1:00 0:08 
5 3:00 8:00 1:30 0:20 0:20 
Table A.3: Execution Time Required in 6 round Approximation of 5 Cipher-A Networks 
using DES S-boxes. 
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Figure A.I: Histogram Showing Maximum Value in Bias-table Versus Count When 
Hamming Weight =2 
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Figure A.2: Histogram Showing Maximum Value in Bias-table Versus Count When 
Hamming Weight =3 
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Figure A.4: Histogram Showing Maximum Value in Difference-table Versus Count 
When Hamming Weight =2 
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Cipher Upper Bound TRI 
(7 rounds) I (L=1000) 
I 4.972e-1O 1.035e-11 
2 1.463e-9 6.82Ie-13 
3 1.388e-1O 2.302e-12 
4 1.388e-1O 3.06ge-12 
5 1.388e-10 3.06ge-12 
6 4.972e-1O 6.82Ie-13 
7 4.972e-1O 1.023e-12 
8 1.388e-1O 1.534e-12 
9 4.972e-1O 7.76Oe-12 
10 4.972e-1O 2.557e-12 
II 4.972e-1O 1.3640-12 
12 4.972e-1O 3.06ge-12 
13 1.388e-1O 1.023e-12 
14 1.463e-9 1.705e-12 
15 1.463e-9 3.06ge-12 
16 4.972e-1O 3.410e-12 
17 1.463e-9 2.775e-1O 
18 1.388e-10 1.035e-11 
19 1.388e-10 1.023e-12 
20 1.388e-1O 1.227e-11 
TRI 
(L=100) 
1.705e-12 
8.526e-14 
2.302e-12 
l.364e-12 
2.046e-12 
2.l3le-14 
8.526e-13 
1.534e-12 
3.830e-12 
2.557e-12 
l.364e-12 
3.06ge-12 
6.82Ie-13 
1.705e-12 
2.30Ie-12 
1.534e-12 
1.110e-1O 
4.604e-12 
8.526e-14 
1.091e-11 
I' 
, 
TRI 
(L=50) 
5.755e-13 
7.105e-15 
1.332e-14 
1.3640-12 
2.046e-12 
3.996e-15 
8.526e-13 
6.82Ie-13 
3.830e-12 
2.557e-12 
1.3640-12 
1.332e-13 
9.094e-13 
1.705e-12 
1.534e-12 
8.526e-13 
1.l10e-1O 
4.604e-12 
8.526e-14 
1.091e-ll 
Table A.4: Maximum Differential Probability for 7 Round Approximation of Cipher-B 
Network 
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Cipher TRI (L=lOOO) TRI (L=lOO) TRI (L=50) 
Time(min:sec) Time(min:sec) Time{min:sec) 
1 36:07 31:41 31:27 
2 49:07 35:11 30:46 
3 45:30 31:30 30:34 
4 41:52 30:52 30:10 
5 38:31 30:21 30:06 
6 38:37 30:44 34:06 
7 44:04 29:54 29:11 
8 37:4 1 30:32 29:52 
9 43:26 29:37 28:46 
10 42:19 30:41 29:51 
11 43:21 30:36 30:15 
12 41:31 31:56 3 1:16 
13 48:08 31:14 30:49 
14 39:51 30:51 29:58 
15 41:30 31:43 3 1:45 
16 37:03 33:34 40:22 
17 45:42 29049 29:15 
18 39:04 30:31 30:28 
19 41:47 31:33 29:56 
20 42:24 30:04 29:33 
Table A.5: Execution Time Required for 7 Round Differential Characteristic of 20 
Different Cipher-B Networks using Random S-boxes 
114 

" 

